ARMY FAVORITISM

In the battle of the bulge, for instance, the one man who consistently and emphatically warned his superiors that the Germans were going to attack was Col. B. Abbott Dickson, chief of intelligence for the 2nd army.

Based on interviews with German prisoners, he wrote a report on December 10, 1944, six days before the attack, warning that it was coming.

His report, labelled “No. 37,” is in the files of the war department.

But on December 12, Col. Dickson’s superior intelligence officer in the 12th army group wrote a report saying that no such attack was possible. The man responsible for this report was Gen. Edwin L. Sibert.

If the gallant 106th division had had warning; if SHAEF had sent reinforcements opposite the German lines, the 60,000 U. S. casualties might have been a different story.

Today, Col. Dickson, the man who was right, is out of the army. He retired because he wasn’t getting anywhere. He didn’t know the right people.

And Gen. Sibert, the man who was wrong, has been promoted to be top ranking intelligence officer for the entire U. S. army in Germany.

Again, Col. Otis K. Saddler and Col. R. S. Bratton, the two colonels who urged and begged that something be done about warning Pearl Harbor just before the Japs struck, never got one single, solitary promotion.

Other colonels and lieutenant colonels all around them were promoted to be generals.

Col. Bedell Smith, who did not act on Saddler’s and Bratton’s suggestions, is now to be deputy chief of staff. But the colonels who were right stood still.

The army owes it not only to the men who were pushed aside, but to the public, to rectify this favoritism before asking congress to vote peacetime conscription or the swallowing up of the navy.

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1945-12-06 Could have prevented the Bulge

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