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XIX Corps Moves to the Roer
Having smashed the Siegfried Line, and made
possible the capture of Aachen, Corps prepared to move up to the Roer
River and set the stage for the final drive into the heart of Germany.
On the 18th of October we welcomed our new Corps Commander, Major General
Raymond S. McLain, a battle-tried fighting soldier, whose trial by fire
had started as a machine-gun company commander in the First World War. In
the current war he had led troops under fire in some of the grimmest
fighting in the Mediterranean and France: in Sicily, at Salerno, and
Anzio, in the fighting in Normandy with the 30th Division Artillery; later
as the commander of the 90th Division. His unmistakable mark has been on
all the subsequent operations of this fighting Corps: its thorough
planning and preparation, its speed of attack, its recognition of the
doughboys' and tankers' problems, and the constant insistence on the least
possible cost of every operation in human lives.
On October 22nd the XIX Corps became part of the new Ninth Army, and much
of the success of this new Army was be in the early days to the veteran
spear-head of the battle-tried men and units that the Corps brought to its
operations.
General Eisenhower had announced that there was to be no winter lull, and
as part of the great American fall offensive all along the line, the XIX
Corps attacked for the Roer River in the middle of November. The main push
of the Twelfth Army Group was concentrated further south, and the Ninth
Army including XI Corps was ordered to move up to the line of the Roer, to
guard the left flank of the Army Group attack. Actually the Corps finished
its job well ahead of the other units in the great attack, although the
opposition was as bitter as any the German ever offered. The answer lay in
the fact that a veteran combination of divisions and directing Corps knew by long experience most of the
answers, and had the highest confidence in each other. XIX Corps
Headquarters never asked its divisions to do more than the possible, and
always gave them the utmost in intelligence, thorough planning,
overwhelming support in Artillery, Engineering operations, Supply, and
Anti-tank and AA protection. It was a well-tried combination of old
friends: the 2nd Armored, the 29th and the 30th Divisions, and the XIX
Corps Staff and Corps troops.
Jumping off on the 16th of November, the 29th and 30th Infantry and the
2nd Armored Divisions drove forward over the flat, scarred, muddy
countryside against desperate German resistance made from long prepared
defensive positions. To halt this drive the Germans command committed his
best - the 9th Panzer and 15th Panzer Grenadier Divisions against our left
flank and the 3rd Panzer Grenadier and elements of 11601 Panzer Divisions
on our right, together with three infantry divisions. As an example of the
intensity of enemy resistance, the 2nd Armored Division and Corps
Artillery and AT units knocked out 118 German tanks in badly defeating the
9th Panzer and 15th Panzer Grenadier Divisions. More enemy armor fell
before the attacks of the 29th and 30th. Captured German staff officers
were unanimous in their praise of the tactics employed in this Corps drive
- complaining that they were constantly confused as to the direction and
strength of the effort by our refusal to plunge head-on into their planned
defenses, and by our unexpected maneuver and feints. Model tactics
executed by hard-fighting as the Schwammenauel and the Erfttalsperre,
built by the Germans for just such an eventuality as now faced them: to
delay an enemy force trying to penetrate into the Rhineland. If these dams
were still under German control when our crossing started, a wall of water
could be released to sweep down upon the troops and bridges, and sweep
everything before it. XIX Corps Teams had discovered in Aachen complete
plans for the military use of these dams, and the Wehrmacht's own diagrams
of the extent and duration of the flooding to be expected. The discovery
of these plans had shaped the strategy of the Fall attacks of the whole
Twelfth Army Group. XIX Corp: had initiated the series of attacks to seize
these dams before it left 1 Aachen area. We knew exactly, thanks to the
assessment by XIX Corps Engineers, what the risk was, and the planning
continued on that basis. Frog] to our south to gain control of the dams
was slow, and repeated massive attempts to bomb them out with great
concentrations of aerial bombing failed. Having calculated the risk, the
order was given to attack anyway on the of February. On the night of the
9th the Germans did what remained for to do with their control of the one
remaining dam, the Schwammenauel, and blew the spillway. This was intended
to raise the level and speed of the Roer to flood proportions and keep it
that way for the longest possible until the great lake behind the dam was
completely drained. The attack to wait. We had no intention of waiting
until the river subsided; only until the speed of the current had
diminished to a point where the river could be bridged. The Corps Engineer
gave his estimate as the 22nd. On the 23rd, the attack was made long
before the Germans thought it could be done.
The crossing of the Roer was probably one of the most difficult river
crossings ever accomplished, and its success against such odds speaks
volumes for the planning and resourcefulness of the Corps Engineers, and
tenacity and fighting qualities of the divisions that made the crossings
The Corps Engineers built a total of fifteen bridges across a powerful,
flood current that brought down debris, assault boats and pontoons, broke
loose from other bridges, to smash their work time after time. Most of
were put in under enemy fire, some under the fire of enemy riflemen. The
bridge was built and rebuilt nine times: Most of the crossings had to made
not only over the river itself, but also over hundreds of feet of
area on each side of the main channel. The first waves of troops went
across in assault boats, 'alligators', rafts, and on foot bridges, and c
them was thrown a tremendous curtain of fire from the Corps and Division
Artillery. Over 500 guns fired more than four tons of steel onto the
German positions. The 29th Division crossed north of Juelich, reduced the
garrison there and moved rapidly on to take the high ground along the east
bank. old citadel was cleaned out in short order. The 30th Division, which
ha been screened from identification before the attack by the 113th
Cavalry Group, had the most difficult stretch of river and swamp to cross,
but t moved rapidly to the other side and had their bridgehead well in
hand by end of the first day. |
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FROM THE ROER TO THE RHINE
Once
across the Roer, there was no pause in the attack. The Germans had been
surprised by our ability to cross at all, with the river at such a state
of flood, and the 29th and 30th gave them no chance to recover. The
thousands of pines, the miles of anti-tank ditches and defensive works
prepared as a result of "community digging", were rapidly overrun and the
ground consolidated. The enemy was also thrown off balance by the
direct-ion taken by the Ninth Army's main effort, as made by XIX Corps,
once across the Roer. He had expected us to head for Cologne, and when the
attack angled east and then north, all his preparations were thrown off
balance. The German divisions wheeling to meet the threat, and those
coming down from the north as reinforcements, were caught in mid-maneuver
by the speed of the XIX Corps' advance. Once on the run, they got no
breathing space to stop and organize. The Corps stepped up its speed day
by day. The rush never stopped until the Rhine was reached.
From their toe-hold on the east bank of the Roer, the 29th and 30th
Divisions picked up speed and momentum. The 29th took Juelich, by-passed
and later wiped out the resistance in the ancient citadel; the 30th made
speed through the Hambach Forest to take Steinstrasse. Both divisions made
full use of their maneuver-room, taking the towns that dotted the area
with speedy and economical flanking attacks both day and night, that gave
the Germans no chance to dig in anywhere. It was muddy, disagreeably moist
country, of small farms with clusters of slate-colored plaster and brick
farmhouses; the tree-lined roads of brick or cobblestones slippery with
mud. Open stretches of fields were commanded by 88s and self-propelled
guns, and systems of trenches on the commanding ground. Each town was a
strongpoint, or had been intended to be. In many of them, however, the
Volkssturm forces were so quickly inundated by the American advance, that
they got no warning at all, and dissolved into civilians without firing
more than a few shots. In some places, where the forces from in front
managed to withdraw and fight a delaying action, or reserves came up from
the rear, there was sharp fighting. The enemy rushed some of the best
troops he had on the West Front - 9th Panzer, 11th Panzer, 130th Panzer
Lehr, elements of 2nd Parachute and 15th Panzer Grenadier, plus assorted
infantry divisions - to attempt to halt the threatened disaster. Our
battle-hardened 29th and 30th, and the 2nd Armored Divisions knew what to
do and did it speedily and expertly.
On the fifth day of the attack, the stage was considered sufficiently set
to let go with the finishing blew. The 2nd Armored Division was ordered in
for a powerful smash to finish off the industrial area on the west bank of
the Rhine centered around Muanchen-Gladbach, Neuss, and Krefeld-Uerdingen.
The whole 2nd Armored attacked all along the line, and despite heavy
resistance the first day, made an advance of six miles. The blow was
stronger because elements of the 83rd Division attacked with the armor.
Meanwhile the 29th Division continued its drive, and by the first of March
had taken and cleaned up the last resistance in Muenchen-Gladbach-Rheydt.
This was an important manufacturing city, with large cloth and steel
mills.
The 2nd Armored drove between Muenchen-Gladbach and Neuss and continued
north to reduce the manufacturing centers of Uerdingen. The 83rd Division,
an outstanding newcomer to the Corps, peeled off to the right, and
proceeded to clean up Neuss, and came very close to seizing the big Rhine
bridge there intact. The 2nd Battalion of the 331st Infantry was the first
to reach the Rhine just south of Neuss. Meanwhile the 30th Division
and the 113th Cavalry Group had been guarding the right flank of the Corps
along the Brit River, until the units of VII Corps came up the other side
of the river and relieved them of that task.
By the fifth of March the 2nd Armored had taken Uerdingen, and the task of
the Corps was finished, for this operation. The speed of the Corps advance
cans near taking several of the bridges across the Rhine, but the enemy
finally succeeded in blowing them all at the last moment, often marooning
considerable numbers of energy troops in the process.
XIX Corps was ready and anxious to force the Rhine forthwith, and believed
firmly it could be done. But higher headquarters decided to wait until the
drive could be set up to go all the way to Berlin, once we were across.
The divisions of the Corps moved up solidly along 26 miles of the Rhine's
left bank.
In the ten day drive, XIX Corps took more than 11,000 prisoners, 353
towns, and over 300 square miles of territory at the price of a
proportionately very small casualty list. Corps Artillery fired nearly
2500 missions for a total of about 250,000 rounds; Corps Engineers built
3040 feet of all types of bridges; the Tank Destroyers destroyed 65 enemy
tanks and armored vehicles, and the Corps AAA shot down 30 planes. It was
a dashing example of fine teamwork and dynamic direction. |
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FROM THE RHINE TO FINAL VICTORY
XIX Corps climaxed its brilliant record in
the war in Europe by a dazzling display of speed and efficiency in the
final push that toppled the German Army in the West and helped to finish
the war.
In the great Allied plan for finishing the war, XIX Corps was selected to
spearhead the Ninth Army drive out of the Rhine bridgehead after the
crossing had been forced for Berlin. However, the Corps Engineer, Colonel
Hubert S. Miller had command of all the naval and engineer forces involved
in the great amphibious operation on the Rhine, and XIX Corps Artillery
lent its fire per to the massive concentrations that covered the
crossings. The Flak Suppression barrage that XIX Corps Artillery
under Brigadier General George D. Shea fired on the southern landing area
of the simultaneous air-borne operation was so efficient that not one
friendly plane or glider was brought down by enemy antiaircraft fire in
that zone !
On the night of the 23rd of March, the great crossing operation began, and
by the 29th the 2nd Armored Division of XIX Corps was across the Rhine and
attacking east. The 83rd Division was motorized with the trucks of XIX
Corps Artillery and given the task of following up the 2nd Armored's
advance, to form the northern arm of the giant pincers movement which was
to cut off the Ruhr district. The drive went on day and night. All the
bridges on the Dortmund-Ems Canal, the first of many water obstacles, were
found blown, but by the afternoon of the 30th of March the 2nd Armored
Division had built their own bridges and were across and rolling again. A
long, narrow, threatening armored finger was thus thrust deep into inner
Germany. In the vicinity of Haltern to which the Corps CP moved, the 88s
from the south kept the one road over which the Corps had to deploy all
its divisions under almost constant fire. One Regimental Combat Team of
the 17th Airborne Division held the Germans off to the south, while three
divisions swarmed through the narrow gap. The 30th Division which had made
the original Rhine crossing came back to XIX Corps along with the 15th and
113th Cavalry Groups. A few days later the 8th Armored Division was added
to the Corps.
Then began the successful accomplishment of one of the biggest operations
ever conducted by one Corps. The 2nd Armored by-passed the great city of
Hamm, leaving it to be cleaned up by the 95th Division, and angled
south-east to Lippstadt where they met the 3rd Armored Division on the
afternoon of the 1st of April to close the Ruhr pocket. Here the Ninth and
First US Armies cut off and captured over 300,000 German troops, and the
last remaining industrial area of Germany. Germany's doom was sealed !
Great numbers of depots, airfields, factories, stores, rolling stock and
dumps fell into our hands in this area; the roads began to fill with
hundreds of thousands of Russians, French, Jugoslays, Poles, French,
Dutch, Belgian, Hungarian and Italians.
After the sealing-off of the Ruhr, the Corps had two fronts, moving
rapidly away from each other. To the northeast the 2nd Armored flanked by
the 83rd and the 30th rolled toward the Weser, the Elbe and Berlin; to the
southwest the 8th Armored, the recently attached 95th, and the Regimental
Combat Team of the 17th Airborne were reducing the Ruhr pocket. At one
time these two fronts were 125 miles apart; but during the entire
operation the units of the Corps were completely under its control, and
the Divisions in good battle formation. It is doubtful if any Corps was
ever faced with as many varied situations in such a limited time. The good
order that obtained all through the operation, often under strong and
sometimes unexpected resistance. speaks highly for the fine leadership
superior discipline staff work and communications.
The 2nd Armored Division, attacking east in two columns, came up against
the Teutoburger Forest on a long, high ridge running north and south all
across the sector. In the early years of the Christian Era, the German
tribes had inflicted a decisive defeat on the Roman General Varus and his
legions on this dark and bloody ground. Here the Germans of this day tried
to stand and fight. The 30th and 83rd Divisions came up rapidly to where
the 2nd Armored was engaged in the passes of this forest, and together
these three veteran organizations broke through after several days of
heavy fighting. By the 4th of April the 2nd Armored had reached the Weser
River near Hameln, of Pied Piper fame. The Weser was a formidable military
obstacle in itself, but on the 5th of April a crossing was forced and a
bridge was built. By the next day there were three bridges, and the 2nd
Armored had advanced almost to Hildesheim, the 30th on the left flank had
taken Hameln, and the 83rd had swarmed across on the right flank of the
2nd Armored and advanced 17 miles beyond the river.
On orders from Ninth Army, these spearhead divisions halted and took the
opportunity to reorganize while the attack continued behind them against
the north and east of the Ruhr pocket. On the 9th of April, XVI Corps took
over this western front and XIX Corps turned its whole attention east
again.
Now began a drive unparalleled in this war for speed and effectiveness.
The 2nd Armored Division was to make 57 miles in one day, and the 30th and
83rd Divisions, by drive and organization nothing short of miraculous,
kept up with the armor on each flank. Screening the Corps flanks was the
113th Cavalry Group that has been a versatile and hard-fighting member of
XIX Corps since the early days in Normandy. On the north the 30th Division
advanced to Braunschweig where stiff resistance developed. In one day the
city was enveloped and cleared, and the 30th had pushed on another 30
miles. The 83rd meanwhile had driven 30 miles to take Halberstadt, and
seal off the east and north of another pocket in the Harz Mountains,
center of much tradition of the ancient German gods.
The 2nd Armored Division moved on in its speed to take the great Hermann
Goering Steel Works just south of Immendorf after a sharp fight, and on
the 11th of April went its phenomenal course of 57 miles in a single day,
to reach the Elbe River, last natural barrier before Berlin, just south of
Magdeburg. The 83rd was not to be outdone. They reached the Elbe River on
the 12th of April at the town of Barby. Magdeburg showed signs of offering
strong resistance, so the 2nd Armored immediately crossed the Elbe south
of the city, and moved out with two battalions to form a bridgehead. The
bridge that was begun here received such heavy artillery fire that it was
abandoned to put all available bridging into the crossing that had been
begun opposite the foothold that the 83rd had by this time also gained on
the east bank of the Elbe. By the 13th of April the 83rd's bridgehead,
reinforced by CC R of the 2nd Armored Division was seven miles deep and
firmly held. The 2nd Armored's bridgehead was successfully withdrawn to
concentrate all our forces in the southern bridgehead. There the XIX Corps
held, on orders, waiting for the junction with the Soviets who were by
this time not far away. An attack was launched meanwhile on Magdeburg, on
the 17th of April, the 30th Division attacking from the north and the 2nd
Armored from the south. By noon, the last resistance west of the Elbe in
XIX Corps zone had been wiped out.
From its commitment out of the Rhine bridgehead on the 30th of March, XIX
Corps had advanced 220 miles, with crossings of the Weser and the Elbe
Rivers, captured 172,000 prisoners, took the cities of Braunschweig,
Magdeburg, Hamm, Halberstadt, Hameln, Hildesheim and Soest, and countless
other towns of lesser size. At one time it was threatening Berlin and at
the same time driving to compress the Ruhr pocket, with 5-1/2 divisions
and two Cavalry Groups under its command. There is no doubt that the
troops of XIX Corps deserve a considerable part of the credit for the
early end of the war. That the supply, planning and intelligence functions
of the Corps Head-quarters were adequate to such a series of unprecedented
situations is the highest tribute any such organization could boast.
While we waited for the Russians to appear, XIX Corps held the banks
of the Elbe, and got dawn to the business of instituting military
government over an enormous area, evacuating thousands of liberated
prisoners of war, feeding and evacuating hundreds of thousands of
displaced persons.
Finally on the 30th of April, the 125th Cavalry Squadron of the 113th
Cavalry Group moved out from the bridgehead at Zerbst, and made contact
with the 1st Battalion of the 340th Regiment of the 121st Infantry
Division of the Red Army at Apollensdorf. The task of the XIX Corps was
over.
XIX Corps was the first into Belgium, the first into Holland, the first to
reach the Wurm River, the first to breach the Siegfried Line against
serious opposition, first to reach the Roer River, and the first American
troops to reach the lower Rhine. After a delayed crossing of the Rhine,
troops of the Corps were the first to reach the Weser, first to reach and
cross the Elbe, and would have been first in Berlin, had it fallen to
American troops in the Grand Strategy of the war to take Berlin. From the
beaches of Normandy in early June to east of the Elbe - over 800 miles -
the Corps has been out of the line only two days. XIX Corps had
demonstrated itself, from Normandy to the Elbe, to be one of the
outstanding fighting teams of this war. |
Page last revised
12/28/2013