LST133/A9-8 USS LST # 133
Serial No. 00174 
Fleet Post Office


                                                 New York, N.Y.
                                                 18 June 1944

From:                      Commanding Officer
To:                        Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet.

Via:                        (1) Commander 1ST Group 30
                            (2) Commander Assault Group 0-3 (CTG 124,5)
                            (3) Commander Assault Force 0 (CTF 124)
                            (4) Commander Eleventh Amphibious Force.

 

Subject:                   Action Report- 15 June l944 -  Operation Neptune.

Part 1.

 

1. During the period indicated, this ship was assigned to the Western Task Force, Assault Force 0, Group 0-3. We were transporting our third cargo of Army vehicles and personnel from Portland Harbor, Dorset, England, to Beach OMAHA, North French Coast.

 

Part 11.

 

1. We finished loading at Portland during the late afternoon of l4 June 1944 and were ordered to join convoy EPL 8 to sortie at 2200. Upon arrival at the assembly area we were delayed by late delivery of two C. B. Rhino tugs to be towed to Beach OMAHA, and were unable to pass the R/V/bouy until 2310, which put us 300 yards astern of convoy. During the night every effort was made to close the convoy. At 0044, upon sighting star shells, an E-Boat attack was suspected, so the ship was slowed to 1/3 for three minutes, but thereafter flank speed was resumed and maintained. By 0507, when the convoy was passing point Zebra, we had gained our position, but soon after began to lose distance, and although revolutions were increased to 315, 15 higher than flank, at 0816 we were about 2000 yards behind station, maintaining bearings on guide.

 

2. At 0816 we were in position 50-01.5 N 0-49.) W, course 170º true, degaussing on and checked on recent change of course, speed with tow estimated at 10 knots, condition or readiness 11. material condition Zed. modif±ed*. Without warning an underwater explosion, presumed to be a mine, rocked the ship and blew the greater part of the fantail into the water. The ship went immediately into general quarters. The starboard engine stalled. One man was seen in the water, and assistance was requested of escort ML to pick up this man. AMs 55 and 59 enroute to Portsmouth were signalled to come along side to take on casualties

 

3. Damage is covered in Part IV. Operationally it was immediately clear that the ship was left without propu1sion or steering, screws and rudder having been destroyed. W/T integrity from frame 14.1 forward was perfect, so after checking damage and removal of injured, AM 55 took us in tow towards OMAHA pending arrival of salvage tug. Tug APIKARA took us in tow along side at 1235. OMAHA was reached at 1912, LCIs 490 and 84 stood by to aid in beaching at first high tide, and at 1938 was beached. At 2345 tide was low enough to start unloading. By 6200 all Army personnel and vehicles had been landed.  (*Zed Modifications put into effect by C.O. on D-Day:All X, Y&Z doors closed except between living spaces.)

 

4. On high tide the following morning, ship retracted and was temporarily berthed alongside blockship for sufficient repairs, removal of bodies from wreckage, and shoring to permit towing to U. K. On 18 June 1944 the ship left OMAHA in tow of EMP MEADOW bound for Southampton.

 

Part 111.

 

1. W/T integrity was perfect. No leakage except through bearing packing in shaft alleys, and these were repaired and leakage stopped by ship’s force immediately.

 

Part IV.

                     Detailed report will be made after docking. Damage is summarized as follows:

1.  Nos. 6 and 7 40MM gun tubs blown into water.

2.  Stern anchor winch blown forward and into after bulkhead of deck house and into supports for Nos. 11 and 12 20MM gun platform.

3.  Deck of fantail blown open and apart, large sections being taken out, and the remainder being forced into a hemispherical shape.

4.  Crews quarters demolished.

5.  Steering engine room demolished.

6.  Rudders and screws blown off.

7.  Refrigeration compartments partly demolished—entirely flooded.

8.  After magazines crumpled and crushed.

9.  Gally ranges, coppers, etc., crushed by stern anchor winch.

10.Sheer strake and main deck on starboard side frames 17 and 27 cracked.

11.Overhead on deck  house aft creased and crushed from stern anchor winch.

12.Large pieces of twisted deck plate hurled through the air, except to center tank-deck ventilator forward of deck house.
 

13.In addition, tug ARIKARA taking us into tow along and scarred sheer strake for 75 feet, and put hole forward of frame 27 second deck.
 

14.LCI helping retract from beach drove 3-foot by 1½-inch tear in sheer strake forward of frame 11, 4 feet above second deck port side.

 

 

 Part V. 

 

1. Casualties as follows:

 

           Ships Company:       Dead       7

                                Wounded         17

                                Missing            8

                                Shock              7

 

           Army Passengers            Dead       2

                                             Wounded  8

                                             Missing    20

 

  C.B. Passengers:           Dead       1

                                 Wounded    3

                                  Missing    5

 

 

2. Performance by ships’ company was on a high plane.

All officers and men responded to the emergency with courage and determination.

 

  

F. E. RICHARDS.

 

cc: ComIBTFLot 12

 ComISTFLot 10


 

                                                            2 July 1944 

 

From:                Commanding Officer

To:                  Commander 1ST Group THIRTY.
Subject:              Conduct of Crew- Operation NEPTUNE. 

Reference:           (a) Our Action Report Serial 00168 of 9 June 1944.
                  (b) Our Action Report Serial 00174 of 18 June 1944.
                  (c) Our Action Report Serial 00177 of 19 June 1944.

 

 

1.                    It is desired to report the outstanding conduct displayed by the crew of this ship in the actions detailed in references (a), (b) and (c) which formed a part of Operation NEPTUNE.
 

2.                    In the beachings described in reference (a), circumstances arose that made it necessary for the ship in a period of less than 24 hours to be given 2 virtual suicide missions, namely landing the ship against artillery and sniper fire on a strongly defended beach which had not been cleared of its six lines of underwater mined obstructions, the wreckage of small craft and vehicles left behind in earlier attempts to beach, or of the existing extensive series of ground mines. In both oases, the crew unfalteringly carried through their assigned tasks.

 

3.                  The tactical situation was only too clear to all hands. The first time we started in, the ship was within 400 yards of the beach when it was recalled. The next morning, after night during which we lay at anchor and received Rhino casualties on board, underwent attack ourselves, and watched the beach sustain aerial bombardment, orders were again received to beach, and beach we did. All stations were manned, bow guns and beaching stations were ready at all times. As we approached the beach, half-hidden teller mines be­came intermittently visable on the outer lines of obstructions. Infantry skirmishes on the cliffs overlooking the beach were in clear view.

 

4.                      Alert lookouts and smart ship handling enabled us to avoid the outer barrier of Element “C” obstructions. For the rest, we can only ascribe our successful beaching and retracting to a military miracle. This miracle, however, it is important to note, was entirely unforeseeable, and detracts in no way from the fortitude of the men engaged in what could only seem a desperate enterprise. 

5.                 It may be added that during the time we were dried out after this beaching, although the entire ship was harrassed by snipers and occasional 88-mm cannon fire, ship’s force carried out emergency repairs to starboard propeller, to wit, removing cable which had fouled propeller and gotten intertwined and caught in spact abaft skeg on propeller shaft. 

6.                 Eight days later, as we were half way across the channel on our third trip to the far-shore, at 0816 the ship had her stern blown off by a mine. Details are covered by reference (b). Again the crew showed its outstanding character. Prescribed material condition of readiness had been maintained l00%, and this proved to be the saving of the ship. Many crewmen were caught in the shambles of the wreckage aft, and all hands available turned to on the difficult and harrowing job of evacuating wounded from the quarters that had been hit. 

7.                  There were a total of thirty men seriously wounded. Within a very few minutes all had been put aboard minesweepers alongside, and in tow we continued on the 40-mile trip remaining to the beach. 

8.                    We beached immediately on arrival, and during the heavy air attack that night, unloading was completed on the first low tide. Every vehicle was put safely ashore and beyond the beach line. (Our unexpected success in speedy unloading is testified by the fact that unbeknownst to us the following morning two LCTs were assigned to the ship and arrived soon after daybreak to help complete unloading). During the entire period until the loading was’ finished, guns and beaching stations were manned continuously  

    9.                          It should be noted that casualties from the explosion included acting chief petty officers in the deck, engine, and ship control division. Indeed, all deck petty officers except one coxwain were casualties. This coxswain with the First Lieutenant, took over the entire unloading, and pushed it through in the midst of the severe air attacks, coolly disregarding danger from the heavy flak, and inspiring the army officers and non-coms by their resolute example. 

    10.                        Three days later, emergency repairs having been completed for the return passage across the channel, the ship was taken in tow again bound for Southampton, and sustained air attack as described in reference (c). 

11.                        On this occasion it was clear that the crew by swift and determined action kept the attacking aircraft at bay, exploded at least one of their mine or torpedo missiles, and this in the face of an extremely wearying and taxing period on the ship. The galley was demolished in the mine explosion, and the crew had been living on K rations ever since. Several cadavers were caught in the wreckage aft, and could not be extricated until two days after disaster. A combination of circumstances had caused the after end of the ship to develop and extremely noxious odor. Fresh water pumps were all out; the boiler was unoperational; 90% of the men’s gear had been destroyed-----in general the crew had been forced to live from hand to mouth and under peculiarly disagreeable conditions. 

12.                          None of this, however, found reflection in their fighting spirits and will to go aggressive action under attacks. Every gun on the ship was immediately put into action, including those guns aft whose platform supports had been broken and cracked in the explosion, and whose structural safety had been seriously impaired.

13.                          It is felt that upon arrival at near-shore port, all members of the crew could rightly claim classification of true man-’o-warsman, and could survey their Neptune achievements with pride and satisfaction. 

 

  F.E. RICHARDS.

 

Above information was researched by Frank Towers. It has been modified only to enable its viewing since his death.
Page last revised 01/02/2022
James D. West
Host106th@106thInfDivAssn.org
www.IndianaMilitary.org