

WAR DEPARTMENT
U. S. ARMY AIR FORCES

REPORT OF AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT

06644-222-1
7

(1) Place St. Anna Field, Aux. of Freeman Fld. (2) Date 22 February 1944 (3) Time 2715Z
 AIRCRAFT: (4) Type and model T-10-BH 091 (5) A. F. No. 41-27296 (6) Station Freeman Field
 Organization: (7) AAFTTC (8) 30th Wing (9) 1079th TFS
 (Command and Air Force) (Group) (Squadron)
ET-7 PERSONNEL AFT AFT 5173

ICR	NAME (Last name first)	RATING	SERIAL NO.	RANK	PERSONNEL CLASS	BRANCH	AIR FORCE OR COMMAND	STATUS OF PERSONNEL	USE OF PARACHUTE
(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)	(19)
328F	FORD, J. (MAY)	A1P	12176572	A/C	62	A.C.	AAFTTC	Fatal	No
335G	Frost, R. E.	A1P	15126234	A/C	62	A.C.	AAFTTC	Fatal	No

SEARCHED WHERE SERVED

(20) Name John (21) 12176572 (22) A/C (23) 62 (24) A.C.
 (Last name) (First name) (Middle initial) (Serial number) (Rank) (Personnel class) (Branch)
 Assigned (25) 30th Wing (26) 1079th TFS (27) Freeman Field
 (Command and Air Force) (Group) (Squadron) (Station)
 Attached for flying (28) AAFTTC (29) 30th Wing (30) 1079th TFS (31) Freeman Field
 (Command and Air Force) (Group) (Squadron) (Station)
 Original rating (32) A (34) 1/22/44 Present rating (35) A (36) 1/22/44 Instrument rating (37) 1/22/44
 (Rating) (Date) (Rating) (Date) (Date) (Date)

PILOT'S HOURS:

(at the time of this accident)
 (1) This type 22:55 (47) Instrument time last 6 months 2:15
 (2) This model 22:55 (48) Instrument time last 30 days 2:15
 (3) Last 90 days 22:55 (49) Night time last 6 months 2:15
 (4) Total 133:55 (50) Night time last 30 days 2:15

AIRCRAFT DAMAGE **F**

DAMAGE	(46) LIST OF DAMAGED PARTS
(41) Aircraft <u>5</u>	See attached statement.
(42) Engine(s) <u>5</u>	
(43) Propeller(s) <u>5</u>	

(44) Weather at the time of accident Calling 2500 feet, right, 2 miles forward with light rain. Wind ESE 7 mph.
 (45) Was the pilot flying on instruments at the time of accident No
 (51) Cleared from Freeman Field (52) DSR Lafayette Col. Gates Kind of clearance Contact
 (53) Pilot's mission Light Navigation
 (54) Nature of accident Landing, overshoot field.
 (55) Cause of accident See Opinion of Aircraft Accident Committee in narrative of accident.
 (56) Has Form 854 been submitted? No. 913-23-3036

Accident No.

Pilot's Name

Howe

02 Nature Group

Collision full flight

06 Specific Nature

with ground

07 Underlying Nature

other

07 Cause Group

technique

07 Specific Cause

LACK OF EXPERIENCE -
IN FLYING IN THIS
sort of weather

07 Underlying Cause

07 Cause Group

supervisory

07 Specific Cause

operation

07 Underlying Cause

CAUTION

20%

08

other - personnel

45

meteorological
officer

54

technique

10%

33

weather

55

31

DESCRIPTION OF ACCIDENT

(Brief narrative of accident. Include statement of responsibility and recommendations for action to prevent repetition)

A/C Howe, J. (NFI), Student Pilot and A/C Frost, R. D., Student Pilot, took off from Freeman Field on 21 February 1944 in AT-19 A.F. No. 41-27038 for a night navigation mission from Freeman Field to Lafayette, Indiana to Coldwater, Ohio and return with no landing enroute.

The weather conditions forecasted for the route were excellent but, about an hour after take-off, a light rain and lowering ceilings were reported. All Freeman ships were re-called to the home station.

A/C Howe was sent with other ships to land at St. Anne Field, Auxiliary Field to Freeman Field, where the weather conditions at the time were more favorable. The Control Officer saw Cadet Howe overshoot the field at about 200 feet off the ground, go into a shallow turn to the right losing altitude until he disappeared from sight. Immediately after losing sight of the ship a burst of flame was seen. At the time of the accident, the Control Officer states that it was raining lightly but that several ships were making a normal traffic pattern and landing. The visibility while flying was restricted by rain on the windshield.

Upon investigating the accident, it was found that the airplane had struck the ground in a vertical position and that both occupants were dead.

It is the opinion of the Aircraft Accident Committee that several factors were the cause of the accident with weather a contributing cause. Mild carburetor ice was being reported by several pilots and this condition may have caused sufficient lack of power so that, after the go-around, altitude could not be maintained. It is believed that the pilot noticed that he was too low, and, in attempting to pull up, stalled the airplane at an altitude of about 100 feet. It is also possible that while making a low turn close to the ground the pilot lost the horizon for an instant, causing him to lose altitude. Then, on discovering he was very low, he pulled up too sharply stalling the airplane.

The weather that existed was abnormal and was not forecast by either the Station Weather Office nor the Weather Bureau in Washington. The Weather Officer stated that this condition was impossible to predict.

All pilots of this station will be warned that this situation may occur at any time and to take necessary precautions. They will be further warned that when the forward visibility is reduced, due to rain or any other reason, the airplane will be flown on the instruments by the pilot with the co-pilot acting as observer, rather than have the pilot attempt to fly both instrument and contact at the same time.

4 Incls.

- Incl. # 1 - Statements (10).
- Incl. # 2 - Aircraft Damage Report.
- Incl. # 3 - School Operations Orders Number 31.
- Incl. # 4 - Photographs (3).

R. J. DuCharme

R. J. DUCHARME, Major, A.C.

W. B. Poe

W. B. POE, Major, A.C.

E. L. Chamberlain

E. L. CHAMBERLAIN, Major, A.C.

AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT CLASSIFICATION
Committee.

26 February 1944.

23 February 1944

MEMORANDUM: Weather Conditions Statement by Station Weather Officer.

TO: Aircraft Accident Investigating Committee, Greenham Field, Beacom, Indiana.

1. The following is a statement of weather conditions during the evening of 21 February 1944 and the morning of 22 February 1944:

A warm front with moist air overrunning was present along the Gulf Coast on the evening of the 21st. A low pressure system which was decreasing very rapidly was located in western Texas. From the information available early on the evening of the 21st, light intermittent precipitation extending eastward from central Missouri would have normally been forecast to reach this area shortly after midnight. In my opinion the heavy rain which fell in abundance with which occurred over the area during the night of the 21st and morning of the 22nd which would normally not have been forecast for the period during which it did occur, was intense weather possibly caused by a rapidly moving low over the surface conditions in the area during the night of the 21st and morning of the 22nd.

/s/Carroll J. Miles

A TRUE COPY

R. J. DU CHAINE,
Major, Air Corps,
Aircraft Accident Officer.

Lt. Britton's Statement.

I am Assistant Weather Officer. There was a thin overcast which was caused by overrunning from the south. That was getting pretty weak. From that type of condition, the most you can get is drizzle and light rain. Freezing level that night was high, about 3000 or 4000 feet. Therefore, you didn't run into any icing. I did not forecast condition to close in here until after they got back.

There was a front going through the Dakotas, that was on the map I had before me. It was moving southeast approximately 20 M.P.H. but I didn't forecast conditions to close in from that until 6 or 7 o'clock in the morning. However, this light drizzle would close in around us.

The thing that might cause that thunderstorm is an upper cold front, or a sudden intensification of that in the south. It seemed to close in all of a sudden, there was no definite storm that could be traced across. Possibly a frontal loft could have caused this. We began to forecast that it would close in about 2 or 3 o'clock, I didn't think it would close in until 3:30 or 4:00. I talked over with the flight leader that there was a possibility of it raining lightly. I pointed out rain at Lafayette from clouds above 10,000 feet. There was rain on the 8:30 sequence then for two hours. They didn't have any after that. Naturally, these conditions caused by overrunning from the south are very light.

I didn't know a special came in at 11:30 with rain at Lafayette. I check the specials before I sign the clearances. They were just expecting light rain. I believe it started to rain here about quarter after one.

This was an unusual condition. The Washington forecast was forecasting light rain but very light and local in character and freezing level was high. Lafayette reported rain or light precipitation at 8:30. I talked to the flight leader about that. I had been up before on a reconnaissance flight to see how the visibility was. The visibility was good. Overcast was thin. We could see stars through it. It seemed to me it wasn't very intense overrunning from the south. The drizzling condition is caused by stable air. When the rain at Lafayette started, the ceilings were high. When you get rain from clouds above 10,000 feet, it doesn't mean much. It was raining to the west at lower ceilings.

William B. Britton
WILLIAM B. BRITTON,
2nd Lt., Air Corps,
Assistant Weather Officer.


Lt. Johnson's Statement.

I was Airdrome Officer. My duties the night of the accident were as Airdrome Officer. For the period of night flying, in addition to other duties, I was to be in the tower except to perform the regular duties of Airdrome Officer.

I remained in the tower from 1900 until the check was made on all ships and all except the ones missing were on the ground.

I signed the clearance for the cross-countries and was familiar with the weather as reported by the weather office. I usually make it a habit to check the weather myself. When I checked it, it was contact. All the reports he gave to the tower were contact.

Shortly after returning to the Operations building, we received the report of the crash at St. Anne.


HAROLD D. JOHNSON,
1st Lt., Air Corps,
ASN 0-790844.

Captain Miller's Statement.

I am Flight Commander of Flight 4. We decided to run navigation. Captain McNeely and I checked the weather. The weather office gave us the go on navigation flying. I went back and briefed the students on the navigation trip. They were briefed in regard to tuning in on ranges and on using the ranges and getting any reports from lead ships. The weather man came down and briefed them on the weather they would encounter during the flight. They were all given at least 45 minutes to draw up maps and ask any questions concerning the flight. The lead ship, Lt. Bowers, took off 30 minutes ahead of the flight. They also checked the weather at the home field for haze before starting the navigation flight.

At that time I went to the tower. All ships, both Captain McNeely's Flight and my Flight, got off, I would say, in the course of an hour.

The second order cross-country was made out and the trip was reversed, that is, to Lafayette, Coldwater and return. The weather was checked and found to be the same as the first order. It was favorable all the way through. At that time I was relieved in the tower by Captain McNeely.

I went back to the Flight and Captain McNeely called from the tower and gave me the report that Lt. Bowers had given to the Indianapolis radio on weather conditions north of Indianapolis. Lt. Bowers had instructed all Freeman Field ships to return to Freeman Field. This was given out by Indianapolis radio. The Cincinnati ATC notified us of this report. At that time we held all other ships on the ground, that is, the remaining cross-country ships. I went directly to the weather office and I didn't find any report of bad weather on the course. I had talked with Captain McNeely in the tower about holding the ships on the ground. We decided to call all local ships in to clear for the navigation ships that would come back. Lt. Bowers reported to me after the first order that weather conditions were very satisfactory the entire trip.

It started to rain, I would say, about 1:15 or 1:30. We had all local ships in before this rain started and before any of the navigation ships started returning to the field. Twenty-six (26) of the thirty-eight (38) proposed navigation ships in

my flight got off the ground. The balance were kept here at the field after Lt. Bowers' report. Captain McNeely called from the tower and said he would send Captain Boggs to St. Anne in case this field should happen to close in with the rain. About two o'clock it began to rain fairly hard at this field. Captain Cushing, who was in the tower at that time, contacted Captain Boggs on the phone and said he would send the ships to St. Anne that came to this field as it wasn't raining so hard at that time at St. Anne. That is all I have until the report came in from St. Anne of the accident over there.

I proceeded to St. Anne with Major DuChaine, notifying Captain Cushing in the tower that I was going to investigate the accident at St. Anne. At approximately 3:30 at St. Anne, Major DuChaine called the field here. I found I had two more ships still unaccounted for, one of which had landed safely at Atterbury airport. The other ship was listed as missing. It was found the following day four miles west of Lebanon, Indiana. At no time had the Weather office informed us of any irregularities along the route to be flown and the first indication of any weather we received was Lt. Bowers' report from Cincinnati ATC.


MYRON J. MILLER,
Captain, Air Corps,
ASN 0-789072.

Captain Cushing's Statement.

I am Operations Officer of Flight 4. I was in the control tower, relieved Captain McNeely after the second order navigation had already started. We had already had the report from Lt. Bowers that ships were on the way back here.

While I was up here, several other ships called and asked if we knew there was weather around Indianapolis and asked if we called everybody in, which we had. We just had the cross-countries come in and land as they came back and shortly after the cross-countries started coming, a dual ship, I believe Lt. Parrish, called in and said he had rain at Columbus. Immediately after that, we had a report saying there was rain in the pattern. We called in local ships.

When the rain finally got so hard ships were either leveling off much too high in the air or diving in to the runway, we sent them over to St. Anne to land over there. Captain Boggs had called in coming back from St. Anne. He came over the field, didn't land, and suggested that it might be good for him to go back and wait over at St. Anne. Captain Boggs went back to St. Anne. As the weather closed in, we sent them over there to land.

We stayed on the long distance phone, checking weather over there. As soon as it started raining over there, I called the weather detachment here and asked them if there was any field within 50 or 75 miles of this field where there was no precipitation. They said Cincinnati was the only field that didn't have any precipitation. I don't remember the actual weather report but they said that Madison and Louisville were both still carrying contact weather although they both had some precipitation.

I did not receive any report in the tower that a ship had crashed south of the field. We were not in contact with Lt. Williams when he tried to make a landing.

There was no indication earlier in the evening that the weather was going to move in. I checked the weather myself. The most rain they were carrying then was in the western part of Illinois.

Captain Miller and I were both in the Flight when they Briefed the students. He went up in the tower and I stayed in the Flight until the second order.

Duncan L. Cushing
DUNCAN L. CUSHING,
Captain, Air Corps,
ASN 0-790803.

INCOMING MESSAGE

HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES FOR ACTION I U

OFFICE OF FLYING SAFETY FOR INFO OS

WINSTON-SALEM, NORTH CAROLINA -- FOR FILE

DATE MAR 2 1944

T, W. X.

TELEGRAM

ADM NET

WS V DC NR 49 PRIORITY

FROM ESTES FLYING SAFETY WASHINGTON D C 022013 Z

TO CHIEF FLYING SAFETY WINSTON SALEM N C

BRIEF OF AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT NR 4185

A 22 FEB 44 0215 CWT

B ST ANNE FLD., AUX TO FREEMAN FLD., INDIANA

C A/C JOHN (NMI) HOWE

D EFTC, FREEMAN FLD., SEYMOUR, INDIANA

E STALLED AT LOW ALTITUDE

F WEATHER -- RESTRICTED VISIBILITY

G PILOT; CO-PILOT A/C ROBERT E FROST -- FATAL

H NIGHT NAVIGATION

I CEILING 2500 FT; VISIBILITY 4 MILES; FORWARD VISIBILITY RESTRICTED
BY RAIN.

J AT-10 41-27296, EFTC, FREEMAN FLD., INDIANA

K COMPLETE WRECK

L

M MINOR DAMAGE TO PRIVATE PROPERTY

N TELETYPE

2119 Z

7158/21482/NN

2-22-1

Lt. Bower's Statement.

I am a flight instructor, Flight 4. I was detailed as weather ship to precede the navigation flight and check as to possible weather. On the first flight, the cross-country was not cleared. I was told to go up and check the local weather. I checked the local weather for about 25 minutes and gave my report and was given permission to proceed on the cross-country. Visibility was unlimited all the way around the first time. I landed at 2200. There were no unusual happenings on the first order. The weather was perfect on the first order. I checked the ceiling. I was at 7000, it was several thousand feet above me.

I made the clearance for the second order. On the second order I took off at approximately 2250. I was leading the second order. Upon reaching 5 miles south of Lafayette, I encountered light rain and snow and it increased as I headed towards Lafayette. I tried unsuccessfully to contact Lafayette, made a 180 and returned to ID. Tried to call ID all the way down and succeeded in reaching them approximately 20 miles north of ID. I was at 3000 feet. I told ID to notify Freeman Field to hold all ships on the ground and for them to put out an emergency broadcast telling all Freeman Field ships to return to Freeman Field. I succeeded in signaling several ships back to Freeman prior to contacting Indianapolis radio. I used every method I could for signaling ships to turn and come back. A couple or three of them just signaled back and continued on their way.

I landed at Freeman at 0100. There was a slight rain in the traffic pattern. When I landed at Freeman because of other ships attempting to come in at 45, I had to go out to Uniontown before I made my 180 and 45. At that time the field was easily seen. The visibility was very good at that time.

Donald M. Bowers
DONALD M. BOWERS,
1st Lt., Air Corps,
ASN 0-795348.

11. Harris's statement

On the second or third navigation flight of 11 February 1964, I flew with a navigation flight I. M. Fisher. About 100 miles after leaving La Fayette enroute to Colchester I ran into heavy precipitation with resulting low visibility.

I called La Fayette radio range station at midnight (0000) and asked for weather conditions to the east. They inquired as to my destination. I told them that I was on a training flight from Freeport to La Fayette to Colchester to Freeport. They gave me a report of broken clouds at 2000' - high overcast - visibility six (6) miles - temperature 40° - dew point 35° - slight winds and no precipitation. I heard almost no precipitation and was assured there was none.

I may be in error as to calling out point, and I did report, but I am positive that I gave a six (6) miles visibility and no precipitation. I stated to the station if I was clear for flight with 6000' cloud ceiling from La Fayette to Colchester to Freeport and was told that I was. I did tell La Fayette that I was in precipitation and low visibility over their station, but was assured of clear weather conditions for the rest of the flight.

William Harris

Captain Boggs' Statement.

I am Operations Officer of Flight 6. I was assigned as control ship at St. Anne's for the night transition. I took off here about 7:30, went to St. Anne and opened the field. The field was closed at about 12:20.

I called back to the main field for weather conditions. I flew over the main field at approximately 20 minutes until 1:00. It was raining hard so I went back to St. Anne to act as control ship in case any ship back from cross-country would have to land over there. I didn't land here, circled the field once. It was raining like cats and dogs. I had told the local ships to return here before I had any notification that flying was called off. I believe Flight 4 had some local ships out. I didn't see any local formation. We didn't have any.

After I got back over there, I had a skeleton crew. The ships started coming in. The visibility over there was close to four miles. I could see ships circling, could see ships in the pattern over the town of North Vernon. When I landed in the rain, visibility through the windshield was closing. When I first got there, it was not fit to try to land any ship because of rain.

You could see them circling, they were circling in left-hand pattern. I was trying to give them Morse code. The rain started to let up a little bit and visibility had decreased. I started to let them come in.

109 was overshooting. I had been giving them the red light. As soon as I gave them the red light, he increased power to go around. As soon as he increased power, he made a sharp turn and lost altitude, took up a heading approximately due west for about a mile and made another sweeping turn to the right. All the time he was right down on the tree tops. He seemed to have good control. He got lower and lower on the trees and we tried to pull him up with the light. I was trying to talk with the main field to have them get the ships on 3510. The next instant he pulled up about 150 feet and then I lost him in the haze. It looked like he was pretty safe and I turned around to use the phone and I then heard this very loud motor noise. It sounded like he had full RPM and full throttle. When I heard that, I looked around and just as I looked around, he hit the ground.

On his approach, I would say he came nearly 200 feet above the ground. His gear and lights were down. He was making a power approach. He did not retract the lights. I believe they were on all the time. He was on top of the trees; he flew on top of them for approximately two miles.

After all the ships had landed, I talked to one of the team rides that had just come in. I remembered giving one of the ships a green light and I asked him what his trouble was. He said he thought he was overshooting. When he gave it power, the right engine cut out. He decided to come in any way. So he cut the throttle and dropped in at about 50 feet. There could easily have been carburetor ice. I would say visibility over there was three to four miles.

I was giving code with a biscuit gun.

James S. Boggs
JAMES S. BOGGS,
Captain, Air Corps,
ASN 0-789657

Lt. Holloway's Statement.

I am an instructor in Flight 6. Lt. Williams was in the lead ship on the second order. I lead the first order and got contact weather all the way around, visibility unlimited, no clouds. I acted as weather ship on the first flight. I believe I returned from the first order at 10:25.

I took off on the second order at 11:40. I had clear weather all the way up to near Fort Wayne. At approximately 5 miles south of Fort Wayne, I ran into heavy rain. I was going toward Fort Wayne. I contacted Fort Wayne radio and asked for a weather report. They reported occasional rain at Fort Wayne, contact at Lafayette. A previous report carried icing in the clouds; that was not included on the last sequence. They also reported visibility of 4 miles at Lafayette. I advised Fort Wayne radio to send all ships back to Freeman Field. On the next two ships that called, I heard Fort Wayne advise them to return.

Lt. Williams was lead man. He made the clearance. At Lafayette I went all around and checked the weather. I could not contact the radio station there at all. I called them and reported that I could not receive them and that I was returning to Freeman Field. Fort Wayne had reported contact all around so I went around and checked the weather and then came on back.

At the time Fort Wayne gave me the weather report, they didn't have any change of weather here at Freeman Field. There was heavy rain at Fort Wayne so rather than have them land then, I had them send them back to Freeman. It was approximately 12:35 when I got the report from Fort Wayne. Outside of that call to Fort Wayne, the radio wasn't much use at all. There was static all the way around, couldn't contact the tower here.

There was very heavy precipitation back here with ceiling approximately 1000 feet above the ground. That was an overcast. As I flew I had to keep lowering my altitude to keep below the base of the cloud. I landed here at 2:20. The rain was very heavy then. It wasn't even advisable to land here at the time actually. Everything else seemed to be closed. I couldn't contact the tower to find out if anything else was open. It was just about an instrument landing here at the time. I could see my landing runway going around the pattern but as soon as I turned on the approach, rain on the windshield obstructed the runway so I went around again and made a low approach. Three of us landed pretty close together, one right ahead and one right behind me. They all reported that they had to put their heads out and sort of guess where they were.

To line myself up on the runway, I could make out a faint outline from the runway lights and headed for those. I did not skid the ship any, I could make out the runway enough that I didn't have to. The main trouble was in judging your altitude. The flood light truck was out there. I believe the flood lights were more hindrance. They made the rain reflect back but they helped in lining up with the runway.

Robert E. Holloway

ROBERT E. HOLLOWAY,
1st Lt., Air Corps,
ASN 0-795744.

Lt. Sinn's Statement.

I was on the first and second flight. The first was uneventful.

On the second, I took off at approximately 11:30, was flying formation with Lt. Waterbury. Just before we approached Fort Wayne, it started raining a little. We called off the formation and headed home by ourselves. It didn't seem so bad at that time. We headed for Lafayette, were about 15 or 20 minutes out and it started to get worse. Turned on Lafayette radio but couldn't get anything. Turned on ID, it wasn't much better but I could get Indianapolis.

We took up a new heading of approximately straight south. We hit the beam all right, hit the light line and started down towards Indianapolis. It was consistently getting worse all the way. We thought it advisable to go in the first place we could. We contacted the tower at Stout Field. We circled the field approximately half a dozen times. Another plane was circling at the same time. He got in a little before us, he got in about two o'clock and we came in at 2:06.

I think we had a little carburetor ice at times. I didn't give it a chance. I used the heat, probably every 10 minutes. I didn't want to give it a chance to ice. The radio reception of the beam was very bad. I would turn it as low as I possibly could. The radio was bad all the time. We would get the beam for maybe 1½ minutes and then static would build up so that we couldn't distinguish it and we would turn it down low again. It was hard to fly the beam.

I couldn't tell if they were putting out any calls for Freeman Field ships to return because I couldn't get it long enough.

Darrell M. Sinn
DARRELL M. SINN,
2nd Lt., Air Corps.

WAR DEPARTMENT
366th SUB DEPOT
Seymour, Indiana

93-24 JES/eb

23 February 1944

SUBJECT: Aircraft Accident Report.

TO: Operations Officer, Freeman Field, Seymour, Indiana



1. Aircraft AT-10BH, Army Air Forces serial number 41-27296 damaged in accident on 22 February 1944, was found to have the following damage.

Airplane	100%
Radio Equipment	100%
Engines	100%
Propeller Assemblies	100%
Instruments	100%
Furnishings	100%

NOTE: Airplane crashed and burned.

Disposition: Airplane Surveyed.

Edward P. White
EDWARD P. WHITE
Major, Air Corps
Maintenance Officer.



NT-10!

INCOMING MESSAGE

HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES

FOR ACTION AU

OFFICE OF FLYING SAFETY

FOR INFO OS

WINSTON-SALEM, NORTH CAROLINA

FOR FILE

DATE 22 FEB 44

T.W.X.

TELEGRAM

ADM NET

FROM COMMANDING OFFICER FREEMAN FIELD SEYMOUR INDIANA FEB 22 1223Z ER
TO CHIEF FLYING SAFETY
AAF NISSEN BUILDING
WINSTON-SALEM NORTH CAROLINA

Aircraft 5
Engines 4
Prof. 55

TL3-466

22 FEBRUARY 1944 0215 CWT ST ANNE FIELD AUXILIARY FIELD TO
FREEMAN FIELD STOP ³² HOWE JOHN NMI A/C AUS ⁴ EASTERN FLYING TRAINING
COMMAND FREEMAN FIELD SEYMOUR INDIANA STOP STALL AT LOW ALTITUDE
RESTRICTED VISIBILITY STOP PILOT FATAL INJURY CO-PILOT - FROST
ROBERT E A/C AUS EASTERN FLYING TRAINING COMMAND FATAL INJURY
STOP NIGHT NAVIGATION STOP CEILING 2500 FEET VISIBILITY 4 MILES
FORWARD VISIBILITY RESTRICTED BY RAIN STOP 41-27296 - TWIN-ENGINE TRAINER
AT-10 STOP FREEMAN FIELD SEYMOUR INDIANA STOP COMPLETE WRECK STOP
NONE STOP SB-DEPOT STOP MINOR STOP YES STOP GROUP 1 END

533

RUNDQUIST

NG
11-12-00

#47/JH/12272

100% (und) 39-95-0

Accident No. 22221

Date 3/1

Checked by _____

Analyzed by J.P. Clark 2 Mar 44


Copied for Wright


Field by _____

Notes _____

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