AU/ACSC/0429/97-03 

THE FREEMAN FIELD MUTINY:  A STUDY IN LEADERSHIP

A Research Paper 

Presented To 

The Research Department 

Air Command and Staff College 

In Partial Fulfillment of the Graduation Requirements of ACSC 

by 

Major John D. Murphy 

March 1997

Disclaimer

The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the US government or the Department of Defense.

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Contents

Page DISCLAIMER ................................................................................................................ ii PREFACE....................................................................................................................... v ABSTRACT.................................................................................................................. vii 
INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................... 1 Research Question ...................................................................................................... 1 Background and Significance ...................................................................................... 1 Traditional Emphasis .............................................................................................. 1
International Considerations ................................................................................... 2 
Military Socio-Cultural Viewpoint.......................................................................... 2
Politics ................................................................................................................... 3 
Tuskegee, Alabama ................................................................................................ 3
Why Study The 477th ............................................................................................ 3 
Limitations of the Study .............................................................................................. 4
Assumptions ............................................................................................................... 5 
Preview of Argument .................................................................................................. 5

FORMING THE 477TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP .................................................... 6
477th Bombardment Group Activates ......................................................................... 6 
Selfridge Field, Michigan ............................................................................................ 7
Godman Field, Kentucky and Freeman Field, Indiana .................................................. 8 

THE “FREEMAN FIELD MUTINY” ........................................................................... 11 Tensions Mount ........................................................................................................ 11 Official Army Directives ....................................................................................... 12 The Final Straw.................................................................................................... 12 Plan of Action........................................................................................................... 13 The Mutiny Begins.................................................................................................... 15 Day One............................................................................................................... 16 Day Two .............................................................................................................. 18 Protest Response ...................................................................................................... 18 Base Regulation 85-2 ........................................................................................... 19 Base Regulation 85-2 Response............................................................................ 19 Individual Courage ............................................................................................... 19 

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RESPONSE TO THE MUTINY ................................................................................... 22 A House Of Cards .................................................................................................... 22 Winds Of Change Whip Up....................................................................................... 23 Mutiny Fallout .......................................................................................................... 24 

CONCLUSION AND SUMMARY ............................................................................... 26 Final Mutiny Thoughts .............................................................................................. 26 Segregated Club Significance ............................................................................... 26 Side-Note On Safety ............................................................................................ 27 Drive Toward Integration ..................................................................................... 28 Current Policies On Discrimination ....................................................................... 29 Summary .................................................................................................................. 30 

APPENDIX A: ARMY REGULATION 210-10, PARAGRAPH 19 .............................. 32 APPENDIX B: RECREATIONAL FACILITIES USE ORDER .................................... 33 APPENDIX C: COLONEL BOYD’S REPRIMAND .................................................... 34 APPENDIX D: OFFICER CLUB ARRESTEES ........................................................... 35 APPENDIX E: BASE REGULATION 85-2 ................................................................. 37 APPENDIX F: SPECIAL ORDER 87 (ARRESTED) ................................................... 40 GLOSSARY ................................................................................................................. 44 BIBLIOGRAPHY ......................................................................................................... 46 

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Preface

I chose to do this research project because I knew very little about the so-called “Tuskegee Airmen” and even less about the “Freeman Field Mutiny.”   This case clearly shows  that  discrimination  can  destroy  unit  cohesion  and  teamwork.	The  477th Bombardment Group (Medium) was sabotaged by the segregationist practices of the very leadership  charged  with  its  training  and  wartime  readiness.	Discrimination  made  it virtually impossible for the men of the unit to accomplish their mission and should send a strong signal to all current and future leaders:  If you want to be successful, you had better do everything in your power to prevent any form of discrimination from driving a wedge between the personnel of your unit.  Discrimination could very well keep your unit from achieving its assigned mission; the very mission you are charged with accomplishing.
Although the Freeman Field Mutiny may never be told in its entirety, the courage of the men involved, and the lessons we can learn from them, should not be overlooked.  For the most part, information regarding the mutiny is documented in the form of bits and pieces under the much broader topic:  “Tuskegee Airmen.”  In the course of my research, I found The Freeman Field Mutiny by Lt Col (Ret) James C. Warren to be the most complete, thorough, and moving account of this history making event from a very dim period in our nation’s history.   Colonel Warren was an active participant in the mutiny itself (he was in the first group of 19 officers to enter the club and be arrested).

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Not only was Colonel Warren’s book inspirational, but his personal assistance and insights were indispensable in accurately describing the mutiny and absolutely essential in completing this research project; I am deeply grateful.  I would like to express my sincere appreciation to Maj William F. Kent (a.k.a. “Clark”), my Faculty Research Advisor (FRA) at Air Command and Staff College (ACSC), who provided constant encouragement, assistance, and guidance.  In addition, I owe a debt of gratitude to Dr Alan L. Gropman, author of The Air Force Integrates:  1945-1964, for his extremely informative and moving presentation  Discrimination  and  Ethnic  Stereotyping  given  at  the  Squadron  Officers School (SOS) in which he described conditions surrounding the mutiny.
Next, I would like to gratefully acknowledge the many helpful professionals at the Maxwell Air Force Base Air University Library, and at the Air Force Historical Research Agency.  Their assistance was critical to this author’s collection and compilation of scarce information concerning the mutiny.  And finally, a much deserved acknowledgment must go to my wife, Susan, for her unending encouragement and support.

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AU/ACSC/0429/97-03 

Abstract

A historical qualitative case study will be performed with the intent of drawing inferences toward potential current and future leadership challenges.	The case study analysis used during this study will focus on the discrimination that destroyed the unit cohesion of the 477th Bombardment Group (Medium) and resulted in its inability to accomplish its mission.  It was more important for those in charge of the 477th to maintain segregation in the name of “control” than it was to get the unit ready for war.
The paper describes a mutiny that was a protest of the racist and segregationist policies of Col Robert R. Selway, Jr. (477th Commander), Maj Gen Frank O’Donnell “Monk” Hunter (First Air Force Commander), and nearly the entire Air Staff at Headquarters Army Air Forces.  The disgraceful situation occurred because of the terrible way this nation treated its combat veterans who had already fought one war for their country and were now on their way to fighting another.  The Freeman Field Mutiny did not win social equality for black personnel, but it did result in black command for the
477th—the white command structure did not survive.	Even though segregation in the military officially ended with President Truman’s signing of Executive Order 9981, true equal rights were still decades away.   Only most recently has our military and national leadership started recognizing the importance of performance over the color of someone’s skin.

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The paper concludes with a brief statement of today’s USAF policies concerning discrimination with just a few possible implications and challenges for all leaders.   First, leaders must identify discrimination early and eliminate it before unit cohesion, teamwork, and mission accomplishment are adversely affected.  Next, the Air Force must possess the very best the nation has to offer while ensuring no group feels dominant or excluded. Finally, leaders must eliminate all obstacles to their personnel if they want them to reach their full potential.  These are the prerequisites if we are to be the World’s most lean, elite, and successful Air Force.

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Chapter 1

Introduction

Negro pilots cannot be used in our present Air Corps units since this would result in having negro officers serving over white enlisted men, creating an impossible social problem.

—General Henry “Hap” Arnold Chief of the Army Air Corps Circa May 1940

Research Question

The question this paper will answer is whether discrimination destroyed the unit cohesion of the 477th Bombardment Group (Medium) thereby making it impossible to accomplish its assigned mission—combat readiness during World War II.  In addition, the paper will briefly discuss today’s policies with a look toward implications and challenges for all leaders.

Background and Significance

Traditional Emphasis

The vast majority of “Tuskegee Airmen” writings have focused on the very successful black combat pilots and their units stationed overseas during World War II.  This paper will discuss a much less well-known unit too busy fighting racism and prejudice to ever

1 

see combat overseas at a time when their nation needed them most.   Nine years before Mrs. Rosa Parks refused to get up from her seat on a bus in Montgomery Alabama, at least 162 courageous airmen stood up to the might of the United States Army Air Force and War Department to make a stand against segregation and discrimination.  To better understand this history-making event, one must first establish the facts in the case.

International Considerations

Responding to the spreading cancer of Fascism and the Nazi threat developing during the mid-thirties, the United States began to reconsider its General Mobilization Plan.  The armed forces were compelled by political pressures to train black men as pilots, maintainers, and support personnel. Mobilization pressures on President Roosevelt’s Administration caused Congress in 1939 to pass Public Law 18 (PL18), then the Civilian Pilot Training Act.1	In the fall of 1939, the Civilian Pilot Training Program (CPTP) established several Negro flight schools in accordance with PL18 and permitted some blacks  to  train  in  integrated  northern  flying  schools.	Blacks  attending  this  program achieved success rates comparable with their white counterparts.2

Military Socio-Cultural Viewpoint

The Army Air Force (AAF), because of the prevailing racist and bigoted views prevalent in the United States military (and society) of the day, remained reluctant to accept these graduates into its ranks.  The military argued that Congress did not require them to employ blacks, but simply to establish the schools and train them.  Attitudes of the day resisted any mixing of blacks and whites.  Since there had been no provisions made to

2 

create Negro Air Corps squadrons, blacks could not enlist because there were no units to which they could be assigned.3

Politics

Influential  black  leaders,  such  as  A.  Philip  Randolph,  remembering  what  had happened after World War One (blacks had served in a segregated army, for a segregated government, confident that their sacrifices would be rewarded after the war) pressured politicians and the War Department to affect changes early in the war.   Changes finally began  to  occur  when  President  Roosevelt,  seeking  reelection  in  1940,  promised  to establish black flying units in an attempt to “shore up” sagging support among black voters.  The so-called “Tuskegee Experiment” was born.  In March 1941, the Air Corps established the first black pursuit squadron.  The “Experiment” was an Army attempt to avoid  integration  and  deployment  of  black  pilot  graduates  into  white  Air  Corps squadrons.4

Tuskegee, Alabama

Tuskegee, Alabama was chosen as the most suitable location for segregated training. During World War Two (WWII), more than 2,000 black pilots earned their wings through the CPTP.  Nearly all combat black aviators began their careers with this program5.  These aviators left an indelible record of success reaching far beyond anyone’s wildest expectations.

Why Study The 477th

Though the more widely known combat aviators of the air war over Europe had problems, they did win a measure of glory during the war.  Their difficulties were minimal

3 

when contrasted with the obstacles confronting the 477th Bombardment Group (Medium). Unlike the very successful all black 99th Fighter Squadron and 332nd Fighter Group, the
477th was commanded by whites and was plagued with racial tensions from the very beginning.  The all-white leadership lasted from the unit’s beginning (January 1944) until Col Benjamin O. Davis, Jr. assumed command of a restructured 477th Composite Group in June 1945.6
It should be noted that until 1945, white non-combat experienced officers occupied all

the key Squadron, Group, and Air Field flying and ground staff positions for captains and above.   This effectively denied black officers deserved advancement and promotions by continually rotating in new non-combat trained white officers.  Compounding the problem, many of the white pilots had less flying hours in the B-25 than the very black pilots being trained  by  them.	Obviously,  this  was  a  very  disturbing  situation  to  the  extremely competent, proud, and qualified black personnel of the 477th.7
The blatant acts of segregation and racial discrimination, committed by the leaders of

the 477th during its brief history, eventually led to a mutiny by 162 of its black officers at Freeman Field, Indiana, in April 1945.  The story of the 477th clearly illustrates what can happen to a unit whose leadership allows discrimination to polarize personnel destroying unit cohesion.  The Freeman Field Mutiny constitutes a significant chapter in US military race relations and demonstrates vividly the racial attitudes of AAF leadership of the day.8

Limitations of the Study

Time and unbiased documentation are the main limitations of this study.  Despite the fact  that  information  is  documented  in  the  form  of  bits  and  pieces,  it  is  fairly  well

4 

documented in several locations.  The most thorough, moving, and factual account of the event  is  The  Freeman  Field  Mutiny  by  Lt  Col  (Ret)  James  C.  Warren  (an  actual participant in the mutiny).   However, there is very little “official” documentation of the event since unit histories are almost entirely silent on the whole subject.

Assumptions

The assumptions made in the course of this study are that it can be evaluated in an unbiased manner and that discrimination was the primary, though admittedly not the sole, factor leading to the 477th’s inability to reach mission readiness.

Preview of Argument

Discrimination polarized 477th unit personnel along racial lines which destroyed unit cohesion and teamwork.  The lack of cohesion and teamwork ultimately led to the unit’s inability to accomplish its mission—wartime readiness.

Notes

1LeRoy F. Gillead, The Tuskegee Experiment and Tuskegee Airmen 1939-1949: Establishing America’s Black Air Force for WWII.   (San Francisco, CA: L. F. Gillead,
1994), 4.
2Ibid.
3Lt Col Robert V. Hunt, From Tuskegee to Baghdad:	Black Opportunities and Challenges,  (Maxwell  AFB,  AL:  Air  University  (U.S.)  Air  War  College.	Research Report, May 1992), 2.
4Ibid.
5Ibid.
6LeRoy F. Gillead, The Tuskegee Experiment and Tuskegee Airmen 1939-1949: Establishing America’s Black Air Force for WWII.   (San Francisco, CA: L. F. Gillead,
1994), 18-21.
7Alan M. Osur, Blacks in the Army Air Forces During World War II: The Problems of Race Relations, (Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1986),  112-113.
8Ibid.

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Chapter 2

Forming the 477th Bombardment Group

Many of the veteran fighter pilots elected to qualify as bomber pilots and serve  with  the  477th.	They  were  battle-hardened  veterans  who  loved flying, had lost the fear of death, and were willing to volunteer for combat with the 477th.   Some of these men had already completed two combat tours and were now volunteering for a third combat tour.

—Charles E. Francis
Author of The Tuskegee Airmen

477th Bombardment Group Activates

Officially born on 1 June 1943, the 477th remained a “paper outfit” until it was formally activated on 15 January 1944.  Without a backlog of trained personnel, the 477th began receiving pilots into its four B-25J squadrons.	Assignments were either to the
616th or 617th located at Godman Field, Kentucky, or to the 618th or 619th located at Atterbury  Field,  Indiana.	The  AAF  had  started  sending  black  personnel  to  military technical training schools prior to 1944 in preparation of the contemplated  non-pilot medium bomber flight crew positions.  These officers (navigators, bombardiers) and non- officers (engineers, radio operators, flexible gunners) as well as the technical ground service personnel and specialists (engineering officers, crew chiefs, airplane mechanics, armorers,  electricians,  etc.)  were  assigned  to  the  477th  upon  graduation  from  their technical schools.1

6 

The 477th was handicapped from its very beginning.	It was subverted by both immediate and AAF leadership.  General Henry “Hap” Arnold, Commanding General of the AAF, even tried to abort the 477th before it formed.2   In the beginning, morale of the group was high, fragile, and sensitive.  The unit’s bearing, uniform, marching, and saluting were as correct and smart as any other unit in First Air Force (FAF).3	Unfortunately, extremely poor planning, disruptive and erratic manning, and training that consisted of repeated routine proficiency missions instead of combat crew training gave the new organization severe disabilities.  However, these impediments paled in comparison to the demoralization and disruption caused by the racial antagonism by the very leaders who were charged with its success.4

Selfridge Field, Michigan

The 477th began its so-called “training” at Selfridge.   Almost immediately, General

Hunter set a tone that would haunt the 477th.  He gave a short briefing to all assigned:5

The War Department is not ready to recognize blacks on the level of social equal to white men.  This is not the time for blacks to fight for equal rights or personal advantages.	They should prove themselves in combat first. There will be no race problem here, for I will not tolerate any mixing of the races.  Anyone who protests will be classed as an agitator, sought out, and dealt with accordingly.  This is my base and, as long as I am in command, there will be no social mixing of the white and colored officers.  The single Officers Club on base will be used solely by white officers.  You colored officers will have to wait until an Officers Club is built for your use.  Are there any questions?  If there are, I will deal with them personally.

Col William Boyd, Base Commander at Selfridge, took the briefing to heart.	He carried out General Hunter’s orders (prohibiting any mixing of the races in a social setting, especially in the officers’ club) with unreasonable vengeance despite clear Army directives to the contrary (appendices A and B).6    His conduct and the unhealthy racial atmosphere

7 

which led to it, ended with a formal investigation by the AAF Inspector General (IG), and resulted in a formal reprimand of Colonel Boyd (appendix C).
General Hunter’s views were now clearly established with his men.  The reprimand of Colonel  Boyd  clearly  demonstrated  that  General  Hunter  did  not  have  a  free-hand  in dealing with blacks under his command.7     Unfortunately, he missed this signal.   Know- ledge of his stand likely helped provoke additional altercations and the infamous mutiny that would soon follow after the unit’s quick transfers to Godman and then Freeman Field. The incident added to the overall general friction that already existed at the time and would soon stunt any further growth or development of the 477th as an effective fighting force.8

Godman Field, Kentucky and Freeman Field, Indiana

The 477th moved to Godman Field, Kentucky on 5 May 1944 (without any prior warning or notification to its personnel) and then quickly on to Freeman Field, Indiana in March 1945 in desperate attempts to isolate itself from the racial problems it had unwittingly helped create—rather than seeking real solutions to them.9    The unit endured
38 squadron or base unit moves (23 Permanent Change of Station) between May 1944

and June 1945.  The three major moves were from Selfridge to Godman to Freeman and back to Godman.  It is true that other groups in the AAF suffered similar inconveniences, but for the 477th the AAF initiated each move not for military advantage, but for racial reasons.10
The move to Godman may have resolved, or at least postponed racial problems, but

from a military standpoint it was a very poor place to train the group.  A survey of the

8 

facilities at Selfridge, Godman, and Freeman, and in terms of weather, terrain, housing, hangar space, runways, ramps, and training aides, Godman was the most unfavorable.11
However, Godman had a feature the leaders of the 477th desired; its proximity to Fort Knox, Kentucky.  Godman officials sought to avoid further confrontations by having white officers join the all-white officers’ club at Fort Knox.  This left the Godman club all-black since Fort Knox had no black officers assigned.  Race was supposedly not an issue since one club was for supervisors and the other for trainees.12
By  the  first  of  1945,  the  477th  had  completely  outgrown  its  grossly  inadequate

facilities at Godman.  First Air Force (FAF) took over Freeman Field on 1 March 1945 and  immediately  began  moving  major  parts  of  the  477th  from  Godman  to  Freeman. Colonel Selway notified all the black officers before their move to Freeman that there would be two separate (but equal) officers’ clubs there.13	There would be a club for “supervisors and trainers,” and one for “trainees.”

Notes

1LeRoy  F.  Gillead,  The  Tuskegee  Experiment  and  Tuskegee  Airmen  1939-1949: Establishing America’s Black Air Force for WWII.   (San Francisco, CA: L. F. Gillead,
1994), 18.
2Alan L Gropman, The Air Force Integrates, 1945-1964, (Washington: Office of the
Air Force History, 1978), 14.
3James C. Warren, The Freeman Field Mutiny, (San Rafael, CA: Donna Ewald,
1995), Introduction.
4Ibid.
5Ibid., 21.
6Ibid., 22.
7Alan L Gropman, The Air Force Integrates, 1945-1964 (Washington: Office of the
Air Force History, 1978), 19.
8Alan M. Osur, Blacks in the Army Air Forces During World War II: The Problems of Race Relations, (Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1986), 113.
9Ibid., 110.
10Ibid.
11477th Composite Group, History:  January 1944-September 1945, 14-18.

9 

Notes

12Alan L Gropman, The Air Force Integrates, 1945-1964, (Washington: Office of the
Air Force History, 1978), 20.
13Ibid.

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Chapter 3

The “Freeman Field Mutiny”

The focus of the mutiny was an Army Air Force officers club that refused to  admit  black  officers,  including  combat  veterans.	Those  of  us  who participated in the mutiny knew that higher stakes were involved.

—Lt Col (Ret) James C. Warren
Author of The Freeman Field Mutiny

Tensions Mount

Black officers were not fooled by General Hunter’s and Colonel Selway’s plan for two separate Officers Clubs at Freeman Field and they did not like it one bit!  They named their club “Uncle Tom’s Cabin” and refused to use it.	In addition, they deliberately elected a white squadron commander, Capt John B. Tyson of the 619th Bomb Squadron, to its board of directors; a move who’s meaning was not lost on Colonel Selway.1
Resistance to discrimination in the 477th began on March 10, 1945 when two groups

of black officers (14 in all) entered the white officers’ club and ordered drinks and cigarettes.  They were refused service and departed without incident, but the visit caused great concern in the all-white command structure of the 477th.  Neither Colonel Selway, nor General Hunter were very confident that their plan for separating black and white officers  would  work.	In  addition,  General  Hunter  had  little  confidence  in  Colonel Selway’s ability to handle the situation.2     Even though no further actions occurred, the

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mere threat of future incursions remained causing great consternation for both Colonel Selway and General Hunter.   They decided a new order was needed.   One which they hoped would be legal, enforceable, and be able to stand up to Army Regulation 210-10.

Official Army Directives

Army Regulation 210-10 is probably the most important document relating to the Freeman Field Mutiny.  The regulation was the very bedrock of the black officers’ protests to their exclusion from the officers’ clubs both at Selfridge and Freeman Fields.  Maj Gen J.  A.  Ulio,  Army  Adjutant  General,  gave  even  more  explicit  instructions  against segregation  in  his  Recreational  Facilities  Use  Order.	However,  most  armed  forces officers’ clubs continued to routinely exclude black officers, thereby ignoring higher headquarters official directions.3
Colonel Selway’s first attempt to circumvent official direction came in the form of an

unsigned order published on 1 April 1945.  In the order, he tried to draw a line between permanent party (white), and the 477th Bombardment Group and their Combat Crew Training  Squadron  (black).	A  later  refinement  to  the  order  separated  facilities  by supervisor (white) versus trainee (black).  However, one of many flaws to the order was in its address.  It was addressed to “All Organization Commanders, All Officers in Charge of Sections and Activities.”  The officers coming from Godman, having not been addressed, could not be presumed to have read it.4

The Final Straw

On 3 April 1945, just two days before the final black replacement group of officers were to be moving to Freeman, Lt William “Wild Bill” Ellis returned to Godman after

12 

having been kicked out of Freeman as an “agitator” by Colonel Selway.  “Wild Bill” was one of the more senior pilots in terms of flying time and graduation date and many of the younger officers looked up to him.  He described the situation at Freeman in a calm and precise manner.5    The officers still at Godman were more interested in the officers’ club situation at Freeman than they were with its flying conditions.
The officers at Godman received the news about Freeman with dismay and disgust. They had just received news that the 332nd Fighter Group was setting records in Europe, shooting  down  25  enemy  planes  on  31  March  and  1  April  1945—the  news  only heightened their anger.   They vowed to demonstrate equal courage in carrying out the fight for equality in the 477th.	They would take concrete steps once they arrived at Freeman Field.6

Plan of Action

A meeting was held on 3 April 1945 under the guidance of Lt Coleman A. Young to develop a plan of action to deal with the situation immediately upon arrival at Freeman Field.  Lieutenant Young was experienced in protesting unfair treatment, as he had been active in union organizing in Detroit.  He was a natural leader who had been the primary leader in a  protest  at  Midland  Army  Airfield,  Texas  involving  black  officers  and  an officers’ club.	Through some very creative negotiating, blacks had won the right to become members of the club there and now they hoped to do the same at Freeman.7
The  meeting  started  in  an  organized  and  calm  manner  with  a  discussion  of  the

problem at hand.	Attendees were simply looking for some method of resolving the unacceptable situation at Freeman Field.	They wanted to resolve the conflict without

13 

compromising  their  rights  of  fair  and  equal  treatment  as  officers  in  the  AAF. Unfortunately, the military environment did not provide for any clear avenue of conflict resolution, especially between black officers and the all-white power structure.8
As the meeting progressed, the proceedings became very heated.  Various courses of

action surfaced and not everyone agreed that radical action should be adopted or was necessary.  Fortunately, cooler heads prevailed as participants realized that this was a very serious business they were in and that they had come too far in army aviation to let up now.	They  saw  the  problem  as  a  deep-rooted  and  bitter  conflict;  a  non-negotiable confrontation.9   The group settled down and finalized their agreed upon plan of action.
Their plan called for a non-violent protest that would be “by the book.”	Black

officers would enter the “white-only” officers’ club in small groups of no more than five officers at a time in close enough intervals to be supportive, yet not appear to be a mass coordinated direct confrontation group.  Officers would continue to enter the club in small groups so long as it remained open.   They were not to commit any acts of violence or otherwise act in a manner that would diminish or be destructive to their primary goal.10
The group realized that any black group of officers entering the club would meet

some form of resistance.  The officers also knew that Colonel Selway would likely react immediately with severe counter-measures, including possible arrest (all understood this was a very high probability).  If arrested, each would conduct himself in such a manner as not to create a distasteful situation.  They were determined to display strict discipline and prevent any undesirable events from occurring.11

14 

As the white command structure of the 477th became more rigid in enforcing its segregationist policies, it became increasingly difficult to maintain good discipline.   The climate became more and more explosive, and the fuse was finally lit at Freeman Field.

The Mutiny Begins

On 5 April 1945, at approximately 1645, the final members of the Combat Crew Training Squadron of the 477th Bomber Group arrived at Freeman Field.  Upon arrival at the base, each officer went to his quarters, settled in, and immediately proceeded to the white-only officers’ club to request service.12
What these officers did not know was that at approximately 1900, a caller warned

Maj Joseph A. Murphy, Commander of “C” Squadron, 118th AAF Base Unit, that a number of newly-arrived officers from Godman planned to go to the base officers’ club to demand entry and enjoy the privileges of the club.	Major Murphy immediately called Colonel  Selway  who  called  Maj  G.  F.  Baumgardner,  the  Post  Provost  Marshal  and ordered him to station the Assistant Provost Marshal at the door of the club for the purpose of enforcing the provisions of his 1 April 1945 letter order.  Colonel Selway also called Maj Andrew M. White, the Officer-In-Charge of the officers’ club and ordered him to lock all of the club doors, except the front door.13
The club entrance contained a small porch with double wooden and screen doors,

lighted by a single, overhead, naked light bulb.	In the doorway stood a single white officer, Lt J. D. Rogers.	He was in full uniform, complete with webbed holster and standard Army-issue, .45-caliber automatic weapon on his hip.  He also wore a brassard indicating he was Officer-of-the-Day (representing the Commanding Officer, and acting

15 

for him and the Post Provost Marshal) on his left arm.  His only responsibility was to bar black officers from entering the club; the black officers were just as determined to enter.14

Day One

The first to enter the club was Lt Marsden A. Thompson.  He was about two paces into the Club when he was met by Lieutenant Rogers who said, “This club isn’t for you fellows.”	Lieutenant Thompson asked, “Why isn’t it for us fellows?”	At this time, Lieutenant Rogers asked Lieutenant Thompson to step outside so they could finish their conversation.  Lieutenant Rogers added, “It is a base officers’ club and is for the use of base officers only.”	Lt Shirley Clinton, who was now standing nearby, spoke up and stated that he was a base officer.  He asked, “Why am I not allowed to go in the club?” Lieutenant Rogers responded with, “I can’t answer that.”   When Lieutenant Thompson turned and entered the club, Lieutenant Rogers followed and grabbed him by the arm. Lieutenant Thompson told Lieutenant Rogers to take his hands off him while the rest of the group entered the club.  The black officers attempted to get service while Lieutenants Rogers and Clinton continued to talk.15
The club officer, Major White, appeared and began beckoning the group to him.  He

stood in the doorway that was the entrance to the bar.  After everyone assembled, he said, “If you men refuse to leave, I will have to place you under arrest.”  Lieutenant Thompson then said to Major White, “Major, Sir, we are not refusing to leave, but would like to know why we must leave.”  Major White responded, “I have orders.”  He took everyone’s name and said, “You are placed under arrest in quarters.”  Everyone then left peaceably and went back to their quarters as ordered.16

16 

Major White and Lieutenant Rogers returned to the bar thinking they had handled the small incident well and things would now return to normal.  They hardly had a chance to relax when, according to plan, another 14 black officers entered the club.   Major White was forced to repeat the same procedure just used with the first 19 officers.  He listed the names and placed the group under arrest.	By now, Major White was joined by Capt Anthony Chiappe, Commander of the 118th Base Squadron (CCTS), who said he wanted the men assembled.  Once they were assembled, Captain Chiappe told the men that if they had any complaints to make, they should take them up with him in the morning.  He told them that as their Commanding Officer he would see what he could do about their grievances.	He ended his comments with the order, “You men go to your barracks.” Again, the arrested officers departed the club and returned to their quarters as ordered.17
Again, the duty officers thought it was over for the night when Lieutenant Rogers

went to the door.  He observed another three questionable officers entering the club but he had a problem when the officers came closer.  Lieutenant Rogers was not sure they were three black officers—2nd Lt James V. Kennedy and 2nd Lt Roger C. Terry had all the characteristics of whites while there was no doubt about F/O Oliver Goodall.	Rogers confronted the officers and tried to bodily prevent Lieutenant Terry from entering the club.  He later claimed that Lieutenant Terry had shoved him aside in order to enter the club.   Major White arrested the three officers as with the others.   Meanwhile, the Post Provost Marshal, Major Baumgardner, arrived at the club and refused admittance to three officers who had tried to enter without incident or arrest.  Major White then closed the club for the night, but not before a total of 36 black officers had been arrested.18

17 

Day Two

Colonel Selway, confident that the arrested officers represented the only group of “agitators,”  reopened  the  club  without  a  Provost  Marshal  on  duty  at  the  door.	An additional 25 black officers entered the club in three separate groups starting at 1515.  No effort was made to stop the officers, but Major White intercepted each group, took their names, placed them under arrest in quarters, and ordered them from the club.	   Major White then called Colonel Selway and informed him of what had happened.	Colonel Selway ordered that the club be closed again.  Those arrested now totaled 61.19

Protest Response

General Hunter’s and Colonel Selway’s first reaction to the protest was to try and figure out what had hit them.  Their next challenge was to figure out how to regain control of the situation and return Freeman Field to some semblance of normalcy, all the while continuing  to  segregate  and  discriminate  against  the  black  members  of  the  477th.20
Colonel Selway was committed to satisfying General Hunter by court-martialing the black

officers.   While he contemplated what articles of the Manual for Courts-Martial to use, Col Torgils G. Wold and Maj Harry V. Osborne, Jr. from the FAF Judge Advocate’s Office arrived.  They believed that technically there was a case against each officer, but there was a slight chance of little more than a misunderstanding.	They felt all of the officers arrested on 5 and 6 April should be released from arrest in quarters and that only the three accused of jostling Lieutenant Rogers should be tried.21    They also suggested a more detailed order should be provided in the form of a base regulation to prevent any further “confusion.”

18 

Base Regulation 85-2

The legal staff was successful in creating a new, stronger, more enforceable base regulation but subsequent events made clear that it would not live up to their expectations. The original group of arrested officers were released on 9 April 1945.  The only exception was the three who were being held for jostling the Provost Marshal.  General Hunter and Colonel Selway now planned to have all officers read and sign a new cleverly-worded regulation  (see  appendix  E)  that  indicated  they  had  read  and  understood  it;  this requirement provided the officers with a formidable weapon to be used in resisting the order.22

Base Regulation 85-2 Response

On 10 April, all the officers were summoned to the base theater at 1500.	Each wondered what was next.  Lt Col John B. Pattison, the Deputy Commander of the 477th began reading the new regulation.  He explained each paragraph, gave every officer a copy of the regulation, and directed that they read and sign the endorsement thereon.  No one signed the endorsement and a standoff ensued.  The officers were dismissed and the next day, Captain Chiappe selected the names of 14 officers who had refused to sign for a group  interview.	He  advised  them  that  they  could  modify  or  prepare  their  own endorsement to the regulation simply stating that they had read it.  Captain Chiappe ended the interview when only three of the 14 agreed to sign an endorsement.23

Individual Courage

Colonel Selway discussed the failure to get the black officers to sign the regulation with the Air Inspector, FAF, and the Assistant Judge Advocate.  They advised him that the

19 

best way to determine whether the officers truly understood the consequence of their actions was to convene a special board.  Each officer would meet the board individually with legal officers, witnesses, and a board secretary in attendance.  Each would be given a direct order by his commanding officer to sign Base Regulation 85-2.  The legal officers were convinced that once the officers were given an opportunity to strike out the phrase “and fully understand,” they would sign.   If an officer continued to refuse to sign after being given a direct order by his commander, he would then be in violation of the 64th Article of War (disobeying a direct order of a superior officer in time of war) which carries a penalty of death upon conviction.  Colonel Selway followed the procedure to the letter. He was sure that the board would be the tool he needed to get these “trainees” back in line.24
On 11 April, all the black officers were summoned to meet with their commanding

officers at the base legal office to be interviewed.  Though it is nearly impossible to know exactly how each and every officer reacted before the board, one thing is certain, 101 officers were arrested (see appendix F) immediately following the conclusion of their interviews for refusing to sign Base Regulation 85-2 or a separate endorsement.25   Colonel Selway stated on 16 April 1945 “that a few of the trainee officers signed it as written, some signed it striking out the words ‘and fully understand,’ and others signed it, but wrote endorsements claiming that it was racial discrimination.”
Major Osborne, wanting to please General Hunter, believed mutiny should be added to  the  charge  of  violating  Article  64.	He  felt  that  when  the  officers  of  the  619th Bombardment Squadron persisted, on 11 April, and refused to certify that they had read the regulation, they were joining in the mutiny which had started on the 10th when the

20 

meeting of officers refused to sign it (disobeying the lawful order of their commander, Major Tyson).  He used the same rationale in a charge of mutiny against the members of Squadron E, 118th AAF, Base Unit who also refused to sign Base Regulation 85-2.26
All in all, a total of 162 black officers were arrested at Freeman Field for entering the

white-only officers’ club and for refusing to sign a statement that they had read and understood Base Regulation 85-2.27

Notes

1James C. Warren, The Freeman Field Mutiny, (San Rafael, CA: Donna Ewald,
1995), 30.
2Ibid., 31.
3Ibid., 33.
4Ibid., 36.
5Ibid., 1.
6Ibid., 2.
7Ibid., 3.
8Ibid.
9Ibid., 4.
10Ibid., 6.
11Ibid., 5.
12Ibid.
13Ibid., 8.
14Ibid.
15Ibid., 9.
16Ibid.
17Ibid., 10.
18Ibid., 11.
19Ibid., 12.
20Ibid., 37.
21Ibid., 48.
22Ibid., 54.
23Ibid., 56.
24Ibid.
25Ibid., 58.
26Ibid., 65.
27Ibid., 167.

21 

Chapter 4

Response to the Mutiny

The 477th Bomb Group (Medium) never got into combat as a result of its white  commander’s  bigoted  personnel  policies.	The  commander  was eventually fired because he had sabotaged his unit but not before he did great damage to the spirit of his troops.

—Col (Ret) Alan L. Gropman
Author of The Air Force Integrates 1945-1964

A House Of Cards

Faced with the courage of more than 162 young black airmen, the racist chain of command  of  the  477th  began  to  crumble.	General  Hunter  lost  all  faith  in  Colonel Selway’s ability to handle the situation in a way that would maintain his segregationist policies and at the same time not get him or his command into any more trouble.	He began to feel the heat, and it was not long before he began to place the blame on someone else.   He started lobbying with superiors at AAF to place the blame for the “mess” at Freeman on Colonel Selway.  He defended his policies with excuses and false premises. He blamed the mutiny on every possible organization and person he could identify.1
General Hunter’s unwillingness to apply his regulation to all bases throughout his

command demonstrated clearly that his true desire was to segregate by race rather than by function.  Yet official correspondence from the AAF IG to the Secretary of War claimed

22 

that functional separation was stubbornly maintained as General Hunter’s only goal.2   The AAF did not buy into Base Regulation 85-2 but they tried to back General Hunter and Colonel Selway on the military offenses that the 101 were charged under.3

Winds Of Change Whip Up

General  Hunter  did  not  fully  appreciate  the  significance  of  changes  that  were occurring throughout the Nation.  He paid little attention to changing times, related facts, and in many cases even tried to control the press.  He tried to control anyone and anything that could undercut his racially biased views.  It is important to remember that leaders in Washington D.C. were beginning to feel the political pressures of an increasingly well organized black press, equal rights advocacy groups, and the American public (voters). President Roosevelt, had supported blacks in Army aviation since running for a third term in  the  1940  election.	President  Truman  was  equally  as  supportive  after  President Roosevelt’s death.   Others in the War Department were supportive, but there were still remained many senior leaders who continued their discriminatory and segregationist practices despite official policies to the contrary.4
Pressure on Congress was beginning to have an effect and the War Department was

finally forced to intervene at Freeman.  It assumed direct control of the situation and then forced FAF and the AAF to back down on the segregation issue.5    The War Department directed that all but three be freed—58 were released at Freeman; 101 at Godman.  The separate charges against the three were based on their alleged conduct on the first night of the mutiny at officers’ club.   Much to the dismay of General Hunter, the court-martial found Lieutenants Clinton and Thompson “not guilty” of all specifications and charges.

23 

Lieutenant Terry was not as fortunate.  He was found “not guilty” of disobeying an order, but “guilty” of jostling a superior officer.  He was fined $150, prorated over a period of three months.  In essence, the AAF had charged 101 black officers with a capital offense in a time of war and succeeded in convicting only one.  The black officers had tested the segregation system and disobeyed orders.  Because their demonstration was well planned and executed, and because outside pressure had mounted in their favor, they were able to force the AAF and War Department to abide by their own directives.6

Mutiny Fallout

The General Court-Martial trial of Lieutenants Terry, Thompson, and Clinton was the first court-martial on an Army base commanded by a black commander and was the first trial in USA history where the board consisted entirely of black officers.7   The trial clearly demonstrated that deceit and stultifying racism were inherent in nearly the entire command structure of the 477th, FAF, and the AAF.8     As noted earlier, Lieutenants Clinton and Thompson were found “Not Guilty.”  However, Lieutenant Terry was not as fortunate; he was found “Guilty” of jostling a superior officer.   General Hunter was furious with the outcome  and  sentence.	His  endorsement  to  the  trial  reflected  his  bitterness:	“the sentence, although grossly inadequate, is approved, and will be duly executed.”
It should be noted that Lieutenant Terry never appealed the finding of the court- martial.  Instead, he wore it as a “red badge of courage.”  However on 12 August 1995, fifty years after the mutiny, the Air Force vindicated all those who had stood against the unlawful order at Freeman Field, Indiana, in 1945.  The vindication included the removal of the letters of reprimand that had been included in 15 of the officers records and set

24 

aside the court-martial conviction of Lieutenant Terry.  In addition, the service restored all the rights, privileges, and property Lieutenant Terry had lost because of the conviction.9

Notes

1James C. Warren, The Freeman Field Mutiny, (San Rafael, CA: Donna Ewald,
1995), 68.
2Alan L Gropman, The Air Force Integrates, 1945-1964, (Washington: Office of the
Air Force History, 1978), 24.
3Alan M. Osur, Blacks in the Army Air Forces During World War II: The Problems of Race Relations, (Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1986), 114.
4Alan L Gropman, The Air Force Integrates, 1945-1964, (Washington: Office of the
Air Force History, 1978), 24-30.
5Alan M. Osur, Blacks in the Army Air Forces During World War II: The Problems of Race Relations, (Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1986), 115.
6Ibid., 119.
7James C. Warren, The Freeman Field Mutiny, (San Rafael, CA: Donna Ewald,
1995), 167.
8Ibid.
9Ibid., 209.

25 

Chapter 5

Conclusion and Summary

The failure of the 477th Bomb Group (Medium) can be attributed to haphazard leadership that had a cursory regard for problems and often ignored official War Department policies.

—Alan M. Osur
Author of Blacks in the AAF During WWII

Final Mutiny Thoughts

Tracing events surrounding the Freeman Field Mutiny back to their root causes, we can hope to evaluate the situation and better understand what led to it.   By considering possible alternative courses of action available to leadership of the 477th, which might have prevented the mutiny, we can hope not to repeat the mistakes of General Hunter, Colonel Selway, and the entire AAF leadership.

Segregated Club Significance

The  segregated  officers’  club  situation  at  Freeman  simply  intensified  existing hostilities between blacks and whites, driving an existing wedge even deeper between black  units  and  their  command  structure.	The  normal  vertical  relationship  between officers and their men broke down into horizontal relationships among unit members. There was a determination among black officers to achieve social equality, a determination of the AAF to deny it, and the need of the War Department to tell both they were right.

26 

The incident at the officers’ club totally disrupted the 477th, shattered its chain of command, created a complete breakdown in credibility, and resulted in the arrest of 162 black officers.	Frequent changes in station not only exasperated personnel but greatly inconvenienced the unit.1
The study of the Freeman Field Mutiny and the men of the 477th Bombardment

Group clearly shows that command attitudes and leadership principles can significantly influence racial harmony among unit members.  Some commanders did take an active role in assuring the acceptance of blacks during World War II; many others simply paid lip- service to official War Department directives and basic principles of sound leadership. Black officers in the 477th were seen primarily as problems, and AAF leadership used the unit to satisfy political pressure rather than focusing on its potential in contributing to the war effort.2
Though official unit histories are silent about the mutiny and its causes, what is clear

is that another serious interruption in training occurred on 24 April 1945 when sudden orders were received to return to Godman.  Only gradually did the 477th recover from its latest move.  Blacks viewed their return to Godman as proof positive that the AAF would sacrifice training in order to maintain segregation.3

Side-Note On Safety

The 477th was an unusually safe flying unit.	Its first aircraft mishap, a landing accident which occurred during a squall, came after the 14,000 flying hour mark.  Twice General  Hunter  commended  the  unit  for  its  “exceptionally  low  accident  rate.”4	In addition, the flying performance of the group was impressive.  In its first year the 477th flew 17,875 hours with only two minor accidents, neither of which was attributable to

27 

crew error.5   However, between mid-April and mid-July 1945 (right after the mutiny), the group experienced five accidents and 11 fatalities.

Drive Toward Integration

Although the Freeman Field Mutiny marked a significant chapter in the move toward a  fully  integrated  Air  Force,  personnel  in  the  477th  were  comparatively  happy  and certainly less violent than many of the protests that would soon follow.  This trend toward mutinous behavior, with some even resorting to violence finally captured the attention of AAF leadership.   In 1946, AAF leaders blamed Communist agitation for the unrest and made only cosmetic changes at MacDill Army Air Field (one of the largest of the riots) leaving most of the real grievances untouched.  But, by 1971, after an even larger Travis AFB riot, the Air Force was more open to meaningful change.6
Even before President Truman issued his executive order, the AF had already studied

the impacts of segregation upon its effectiveness.  Lt Gen Idwal Edwards, a member of the McCloy Committee during the war, long maintained that segregation was a waste of manpower.	General  Edwards’  attitudes  eventually  convinced  Gen  Carl  A.  “Tooey” Spaatz (first Air Force Chief of Staff) to issue encouraging statements on integration early in 1948.  When Gen Hoyt S. Vandenberg became the second CSAF, he selected General Edwards to be his new Deputy Chief of Staff/Personnel.  By the time the AF integrated in
1949, a plan had been prepared and it did so with speed, grace, honesty, and success. There is no doubt that AF integration, like the “Tuskegee Experiment” many years before it, was certainly aided by presidential politics.   However, the man General Vandenberg selected to handle personnel affairs, General Edwards, was obviously a man of vision.7

28 

Current Policies on Discrimination

As was pointed out earlier, the 477th lost nearly all its effectiveness and did not become combat ready before war’s end because combat training had become subordinated to the question of who could enter a base officers’ club.  AAF leadership used the 477th to satisfy political pressure rather than focusing on its potential in contributing toward the war effort.	Effective leaders must fully understand that their job is to accomplish the assigned mission.  They must recognize that unit cohesion and teamwork are key to what makes their unit do what it does.  It is the job of effective leaders to build unit cohesion; not break it down.	As Gen Ronald R. Fogleman (Air Force Chief of Staff) and the Secretary of the Air Force (Sheila E. Widnall) have stated:8
A quality Air Force is one which creates an environment that allows each
and every member of the team to achieve their full potential and maximum contribution  to  the  force.	Every  Air  Force  member  deserves  the opportunity to achieve his or her own potential, and to work and live in an environment that values human dignity and is free of discrimination.  Each one of us, whether military or civilian, plays a key role in creating and maintaining this kind of working and living climate.   Air Force policy on discrimination and harassment is very clear:  No amount of any kind will be tolerated!

We must recognize that the AF cannot fully isolate itself from societal trends.  Even with commanders’ involvement and education programs, people will occasionally behave inappropriately.  It takes a strong and continuing commitment by each and every one of us (victim, offender, supervisor, co-worker, and commander) to minimize these negative behaviors  and  their  effects.	Unless  the  situation  is  quickly  corrected,  our  ability  to perform our assigned mission will be greatly diminished—we cannot ignore our responsibility!

29 

Summary

A number of issues combined and contributed to the 477th’s inability to achieve its mission.  First, although activated in January 1944, its manning was not completed until March 1945.   Second, training was inefficiently scheduled, deadeningly repetitious, and frequently postponed or otherwise interrupted.  Third, since blacks were relatively new to flying, there was no established cadre to break in new pilots, and without this training, the
477th could not become effective.	Fourth, because racial antagonisms aggravated the blacks’ struggle for equality, 477th leadership continuously deceived their men in an effort to evade their responsibilities.  Finally, the segregation issue tore the unit apart, the most conspicuous cause of racial tension being the segregation of the officers’ clubs.9
Based  on  what  we  have  just  learned  from  the  failed  leadership  of  the  477th

Bombardment Group, the following prerequisites must be met to ensure that we will remain the World’s most lean, elite, and successful Air Force:  First, leaders must identify discrimination early and eliminate it before unit cohesion, teamwork, and mission accomplishment can be negatively affected.   Next, the Air Force must possess the very best the nation has to offer while ensuring no group feels dominant or excluded.  Finally, leaders must eliminate all obstacles to their personnel if they want them to reach their full potential.  This is becoming increasingly more important as we continue to downsize our forces.  It is not only the right thing to do, it is the smart thing to do—leaders must get the most out of each and every member of their team regardless of the individual’s race, sex, or color if they hope to be effective.

30 

Notes

1Alan M. Osur, Blacks in the Army Air Forces During World War II: The Problems of Race Relations, (Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1986), 109.
2Ibid., 112.
3Alan M. Osur, Blacks in the Army Air Forces During World War II: The Problems of Race Relations, (Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1986), 121.
4Alan L Gropman, The Air Force Integrates, 1945-1964, (Washington: Office of the
Air Force History, 1978), 16.
5Ibid.
6Ibid., 32.
7Ibid., 85.
8Lt Gen Billy J. Boles, Discrimination and Sexual Harassment, (Washington, D.C.: AFPAM 36-2705, 28 Feb 1995), 1.
9Alan M. Osur, Blacks in the Army Air Forces During World War II: The Problems of Race Relations, (Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1986), 108.

31 

Appendix A

Army Regulation 210-10, Paragraph 19

Army Regulation 210-10, Paragraph 19 was not intended to protect the rights of black officers.  Its main intent was to ensure that all Army officers would be admitted to all officers clubs on all posts/bases.	However, it was used as a tool by black officers fighting racial segregation.  The critical paragraphs of the regulation read:

Use of public buildings by officers clubs, messes, or similar social organizations:

a.  No  officers  club,  mess,  or  other  similar  social  organization  of  officers  will  be permitted by the post commander to occupy any part of any public building, other than the private quarters of an officer, unless such club, mess, or other organization extends to all officers on duty at the post the right to full membership, either permanent or temporary, in such club, mess, or organization, including the right equally with any and all other members thereof to participate in the management thereof, in which the officers concerned have an interest.

b. (1) Wherever permanent membership in any officers club, mess, or other similar social organization, with the right to acquire an interest in the permanent property thereof, in limited mess, or other social organization must, in order to be permitted to occupy any part of any public building other than the private quarters of an officer, extend the right of temporary membership to all officers on duty at the post and on such reasonable terms as to initiation fees, dues, and other charges as should be satisfactory to the temporary members.

(2) In the event of a disagreement as to the reasonableness of any such terms, the post commander will require the parties in disagreement to submit written statements of their respective views of the matter, and will forward the statements with his recommendations for the decision to the corps area commander, except that at exempted stations they will be forwarded to The Adjutant General for the decision of the Secretary of War.

32 

Appendix B

Recreational Facilities Use Order

General Ulio’s (Adjutant General of the Army) Recreational Facilities Use Order was clearly intended to protect the rights of all officers regardless of their race.	It was published two years prior to the Freeman Field Mutiny and read in part:

The Adjutant General’s Office, Washington	March 10, 1943

SUBJECT:  Recreational Facilities

TO:  Commanding Generals, All Service Commands

Chief of Engineers

1. Letter, SPX 353.8 (8-14-42) MS-SPOP-M, August 15, 1942, subject, Recreational
Facilities at Certain Posts, Camps and Stations, is rescinded.

2. At posts, camps, and stations where the garrison includes units of two or more races, recreational facilities, including theaters and post exchanges will not be designated for any particular race.

3. Where necessary, recreational facilities may be allocated to organizations in whole or in part, permanently or on a rotation basis provided care is taken that all units and personnel are afforded equal opportunity to enjoy such facilities.

By Order of the Secretary of War: 
/s/ R. A. O’LEARY 
Adjutant General 

Copies furnished: 
Commanding General, Army Ground Forces Commanding General, Army Air Forces Commanding General, Services of Supply Division of the War Department General Staff The Inspector General 
Director, Special Services Division, SO 
Director, Military Personnel Division, SO 

33 

Appendix C

Colonel Boyd’s Reprimand

The official reprimand of Colonel Boyd (Selfridge AAF, Michigan base commander) was a clear sign that General Arnold and many of his AAF staff condoned segregation and that they were being forced to accept blacks into their ranks by political pressures.  The reprimand  of  the  base  commander  for  following  the  orders  of  his  superior  (General Hunter) was clearly a misjustice to Colonel Boyd but was the AAF’s way of appeasing Washington D.C.  Ironically, nothing was truly learned from this event by either those at AAF or by General Hunter himself; General Hunter would continue his racial policies at Freeman  Field  and  elsewhere  in  First  Air  Force.	The  sharply  worded  reprimand  of Colonel Boyd read:

1. Investigation by the Office of the Inspector General has disclosed that racial discrimination against colored offers . . . was due to your conduct in denying to colored officers the right to use the Officer’s Club. . . . Such action is in violation of Army Regulations and explicit War Department instructions on this subject.

2. As a commissioned officer of the Regular Army of many years standing you must have had knowledge that your conduct in this respect was highly improper.  Not only does your conduct indicate a lack of good judgment, but it also tends to bring criticism upon the military service.

3. You are hereby formally reprimanded and admonished that any future action on your part will result in your being subjected to the severe penalties prescribed by the Articles of War.

34 

Appendix D

Officer Club Arrestees

Fifty eight black officers entered the officers’ club at Freeman Field on the 5th and 6th of April 1945 and were arrested.  Following is a chronological list (5 April 1945 on page 1 of appendix, 6 April 1945 on page 2 of appendix) of these brave individuals:

1. First 19 officers (April 5, 1945): Marsden A. Thompson, 2nd Lt Robert S. Payton Jr., 2nd Lt 
Roland A. Webber, F/O Coleman A. Young, 2nd Lt Davis J. Brown, 2nd Lt Leonard E. Williams, 2nd Lt Robert L. Hunter, 2nd Lt Clifford C. Jarrett, 2nd Lt Cyril P. Dyer, 2nd Lt 
Marcus E. Clarkson, F/O Frank V. Pivalo, F/O Shirley R. Clinton, 2nd Lt Lester B. Norris, 2nd Lt Howard Storey, F/O Clifton Barnett, 2nd Lt Charles R. Taylor, F/O Edward R. Tabbanor, F/O Norman A. Holmes, F/O James C. Warren, F/O 

4. 1515 (April 6, 1945): Robert O’Neal, 1st Lt William H. Johnson, 1st Lt Herbert A. Harris, 1st Lt 
S. W. Green, 1st Lt 
C. E. Lewis, 2nd Lt 
Leonard A. Altemus, 2nd Lt 
Frank B. Sanders, 2nd Lt 

2. Next 14 officers (April 5, 1945): 
Argonne F. Harden, 2nd Lt Carl O. Roach, 2nd Lt Robert B. Johnson, 2nd Lt LeRoy A. Battle, 2nd Lt Wendell G. Freeland, F/O Clarence C. Conway, F/O Roger V. Pines, 2nd Lt Edward R. Lunda, F/O Victor I. Ranson, 2nd Lt Lloyd W. Godfrey, F/O Connie Nappier, Jr, F/O Robert J. McDaniel, 2nd Lt 
George H. O. Martin, 2nd Lt 
Adolphus Lewis, Jr, F/O 

3. Next Three (April 5, 1945): James V. Kennedy, 2nd Lt* Roger C. Terry, 2nd Lt* Oliver Goodall, F/O* 
*accused of jostling a superior officer

35 

George W. Prieleau, 2nd Lt Edward W. Watkins, 2nd Lt C. Williams, F/O
Maurice J. Jackson, F/O C. F. Lawrence, F/O
D. J. Murphy, F/O Sidney H. Marzette, F/O A. B. Steele, F/O
Harry S. Lum, F/O W. H. Miller, F/O

5. 1520 (April 6, 1945): Edward V. Hipps, 2nd Lt

6. 1540 (April 6, 1945): William B. Ellis, 1st Lt Spann Watson, 1st Lt
Le Roy F. Gillead, 2nd Lt P. T. Anderson, F/O Harry R. Dickerson, F/O

7. 1545 (April 6, 1945): Arthur B. Polite, 1st Lt James W. Mason, 2nd Lt

36

Appendix E

Base Regulation 85-2

The infamous Base Regulation 85-2 in which Colonel Selway and General Hunter conspired in order to legitimize their segregated policies.  General Hunter’s unwillingness to apply this regulation equally to all bases under his command make it clear as to his true desire to segregate by race rather than by function.  AAF leadership is clearly implicated in condoning	this	segregation	practice	through	Inspector	General	findings	and correspondence to the Secretary of War supporting the “functional” separation at Freeman Field while not insisting on the same separation elsewhere.  Base Regulation 85-2 read:

HEADQUARTERS FREEMAN FIELD Seymour, Indiana
BASE REGULATION (NUMBER 85-2)	9 April 1945

ASSIGNMENT OF HOUSING, MESSING, AND RECREATIONAL FACILITIES FOR OFFICERS, FLIGHT OFFICERS, AND WARRANT OFFICERS

1. Army Air Force standards governing the control and curfew of personnel undergoing training, as differentiated from standards governing permanent party Base, Supervisory and Instructor personnel, authorize separate housing, messing and recreational facilities assignment to those to classes of personnel.

2. In compliance with orders from the Commanding General of the First Air Force, and according to Army Air Force standards as outlined in paragraph 1 above, the following assignments of housing, messing and recreational facility for Officers, Flight Officers and Warrant Officer is effective this date.

3. Flight Officer and Warrant Officer personnel undergoing OTU, Combat Crew and Ground  and  Air  Replacement  Training  will  use  the  housing  quarters  messing, recreational facilities as follows:

BOQs and latrine Buildings	T-839 thru T-851
T-854 thru T-873
Recreational Building	T-838
Mess Building	T-837
Club Building	T-835

37

Tennis Courts	T-830

Base, Supervisory, Instructor and command personnel will use the quarters, messing, recreational facilities as follows:

BOQs, VOQs, Latrine Building

Recreational Building
Mess Building Club Building Tennis Courts

T-913 thru T-929
T-932 thru T-934
T-936 thru T-951
T-1050 thru T-1055
T-935
T-930
T-930
T-880

4. Personnel undergoing OTU, Combat Crew and Ground and Air Replacement Training are defined as follows:

a. Personnel assigned to the 477th Bomb Group (M), except those officially designated as assigned for Command and Supervisory or Instructor purposes.

b. All personnel assigned to “E” Squadron or the 118th AAF Base Unit Bomb (M).

c. All personnel assigned to “C” Squadron, except those officially designated for
Command, Supervisory, or Instructor purposes.

5. Officers, Flight Officers and Warrant Officer personnel undergoing OTU, Combat Crew and Ground and Air Replacement Training will not enter buildings or use tennis courts listed in paragraph 3b, except on official business and with prior approval of the Base Commander, Deputy Base Commander, Director for Administration and Services, Director for Maintenance and Supply or Director of Operations and Training.	After normal duty hours, such approval will be obtained through the Field Officer of the Day.

b. Base, Supervisory, Instructor or Command personnel will not enter buildings or use tennis courts listed in paragraph 3a above except on official business and with prior approval of the Base Commander, Deputy Base Commander, Director of Administration and Services, Director of Maintenance and Supply or Director of Operations and Training.   After normal duty hours, such approval will be obtained through the Field Officer of the Day.

6. This order will be distributed to each officer presently assigned or assigned in the future to Freeman Field and will be read by each officer and returned to this Headquarters, certifying that he has read the order and that he fully understands it.

BY ORDER COLONEL SELWAY
—SIGNED (DAVID H. THOMPSON)— Lt. Col., Air Corps
Director for Maintenance and Supply

38

OFFICIAL
—SIGNED (CHARLES J. McFARLANE)— Captain, Air Corps
Asst. Adjutant

1st Ind.

Freeman Field, Seymour, Ind.

TO:  Commanding Officer, Freeman Field, Seymour, Indiana

I certify that I have read and fully understand the above order.

Name Rank Organization

39

Appendix F

Special Order 87 (Arrested)

On 12 April 1945, Special Order #87 was published.  It placed those who had refused to sign Base Regulation 85-2 under arrest in quarters and read in part:
R-E-S-T-R-I-C-T-E-D Headquarters
Freeman Field
Seymour, Indiana
SPECIAL ORDERS	12 April 1945
NUMBER 87

E-X-T-R-A-C-T

19.  The following named officers, organizations indicated, will proceed on or about 13
April 1945 on temporary duty to Godman Field, Ky for approximately ninety (90) days. Subject officers are in arrest in quarters at Freeman Field Seymour Ind and in arrest in transit from Freeman Field to Godman Field Ky and upon arrival at Godman Field are placed in arrest in quarters at that station.	Orders  for  return  to  this  station  upon completion  of  temporary  duty  will  be  issued  by  this  headquarters.	No  per  diem authorized while on this temporary duty.

TBMAA.  CIPAP.  TDN 501-24 p 432-02 A 042525.

619th Bombardment Sq (M), 477th Bombardment Gp (M)
1ST LT ARTHUR L. WARD	0584177	
1ST LT JAMES B. WILLIAMS	0867664	
2ND LT DAVID A. SMITH	0585809	
2ND LT WILLIAM C. PERKINS	01051725	
2ND LT JAMES WHYTE JR.	0839096	
2ND LT STEPHEN HOTESSE	02075599	
2ND LT WARDELL A. POLK	0713064	
2ND LT ROBERT E. LEE	02075548	
2ND LT GEORGE H. KYDD	0828043	
2ND LT DONALD D. HARRIS	02075544	

40

F/O PAUL L. WHITE
F/O CHARLES E. WILSON F/O JOHN E. WILSON
F/O PAUL W. SCOTT F/O MC CRAY JENKINS F/O HARRIS H. ROBNETT F/O DONALD A. HAWKINS F/O GLEN W. PULLIAM
F/O EUGENE L. WOODSON

T-136700
T-62507
T-136703
T-136685
T-136661
T-64629
T-67154
T-66410
T-136705

“E” Sq 118th AAF Base Unit (Bombardment - M)

2ND LT FRANK B. SANDERS F/O WALTER M. MILLER
F/O DENNY C. JEFFERSON F/O JAMES H. SHEPERD F/O EDWARD R. LUNDA
2ND LT JAMES E. JONES F/O SIDNEY H. MARZETTE
2ND LT LEONARD A. ALTEMUS F/O HOWARD STOREY
F/O JAMES C. WARREN
2ND LT CLEOPHUS W. VALENTINE F/O ARIO DIXIONE
2ND LT ROBERT B. JOHNSON F/O CALVIN SMITH
F/O LEWIS C. HUBBARD JR. F/O WILLIAM J. CURTIS
2ND LT CYRIL P. DYER
2ND LT VICTOR L. RANSON F/O LLOYD W. GODFREY
2ND LT COLEMAN A. YOUNG
2ND LT LE ROY F. GILLEAD F/O CONNIE NAPPIER JR.
2ND LT ARGONNE F. HARDEN
2ND LT ROBERT L. HUNTER
2ND LT JAMES W. BROWN JR.
2ND LT CHARLES E. DARNELL
2ND LT JAMES V. KENNEDY
2ND LT GLEN L. HEAD
F/O HARRY R. DICKENSON
2ND LT QUENTIN P. SMITH
2ND LT CHARLES J. DORKINS F/O MAURICE J. JACKSON JR.
2ND LT HERDON M. CUMMINGS

02080926
T-141234
T-136714
T-64630
T-140111
02075601
T-140114
02082572
T-136691
T-131958
0841276
T-140132
02063893
T-136687
T-136660
T-68763
02080886
02080924
T-138243
01297128
0713060
T-138250
0841270
02082649
0838186
0824824
0841271
02069201
T-140092
0841274
0841269
T-140105
0841277

2ND LT MITCHELL L. HIGGINBOTHAN	0841164

41

F/O ALFRED U. MC KENZIE	T-68765
2ND LT HERBERT J. SCHWING	0841273
F/O WENDELL G. FREELAND	T-141200
F/O DAVID J. MURPHY JR.	T-66406
2ND LT CLAVIN T. WARRICK	0841278
2ND LT ROBERT S. PAYTON JR.	01174673
2ND LT THEODORE O. MASON	0838167
F/O ADOLPHUS LEWIS JR.	T-140136
2ND LT LUTHER L. OLIVER	0841272
2ND LT EDWARD E. TILLMON	02080937
F/O FRANK V. PIVALO	T-136681
2ND LT LEONARD E. WILLIAMS	01054447
F/O NORMAN A. HOLMES	T-141212
2ND LT ROY M. CHAPPELL	02068895
2ND LT LEROY A. BATTLE	02075525
F/O CHARLES E. MALONE	T-138247
2ND LT WALTER R. RAY	02068902
F/O CHARLES R. TAYLOR	T-136723
2ND LT ROGER PINES	02068901
F/O ROLAND A. WEBBER	T-136695
2ND LT SAMUEL COLBERT	02082500
2ND LT RUDOLPH A. BERTHOUD	02082576
2ND LT CLIFFORD C. JARRETT	02075547
F/O MARCUS E. CLARKSON	T-139615
2ND LT LE ROY H. FREEMAN	02080947
2ND LT GEORGE H. O. MARTIN	02068900
2ND LT MELVIN M. NELSON	02082653
2ND LT EDWARD W. WATKINS	08142096
F/O EDWARD R. TABBANOR	T-131956
F/O CLARENCE C. CONWAY	T-141193
F/O FREDRICK H. SAMUELS	T-66149
2ND LT EDWARD V. HIPPS JR.	02068897
2ND LT EDWARD W. WOODWARD	02882639
F/O JOHN R. PERKINS JR.	T-64270
F/O ALVIN B. STEELE	T-140140
F/O HIRAM E. LITTLE	T-140137
2ND LT GEORGE W. PRIOLEAU JR.	0713065
F/O MARCEL CLYNE	T-131952
2ND LT ARTHUR O. FISHER	02080946
F/O CHARLES E. JONES	T-140108
F/O CHARLES S. GOLDSBY	T-68764
F/O WENDELL T. STOKES	T-140123
2ND LT WILLIAM W. BOWIE JR.	02080867
F/O BERTRAM W. PITTS	T-140119
2ND LT SILAS M. JENKINS	0838168

42

F/O HARRY S. LUM
F/O ROBERT T. MCDANIEL F/O HAYDEL J. WHITE

OFFICIAL: Herman A. Tapper, Major Air Corps, Adjutant.

T-141228
T-140697
T-68712

BY ORDER OF COLONEL SELWAY: HERMAN A. TAPPER
Major, Air Corps, Adjutant.

43

Glossary

AAF	Army Air Force
ACSC	Air Command and Staff College
AF	Air Force
AFB	Air Force Base
AFI	Air Force Instruction AFPAM	Air Force Pamphlet AFR	Air Force Regulation AR	Army Regulation
ATC	Air Training Command
AU	Air University
AWC	Air War College

BG	Bomber Group, Brigadier General

CAPT	Captain
CCTS	Combat Crew Training Squadron
COL	Colonel
CPTP	Civilian Pilot Training Program
CSAF	Air Force Chief of Staff

FAF	First Air Force FG	Fighter Group F/O	Flight Officer
FRA	Faculty Research Assistant
FT	Fort

GEN	General
GMP	General Mobilization Plan

HQ	Headquarters

IG	Inspector General

JA	Judge Advocate General

LG	Lieutenant General
LT	Lieutenant
LTC	Lieutenant Colonel

44

M	Medium
MAJ	Major
MG	Major General
MOS	Military Occupational Specialty
MP	Military Police

NAACP	National Association for the Advancement of Colored People

OCS	Officers Candidate School
OD	Officer-of-the-Day OIC	Officer-In-Charge OTU	Officers Training Unit

PCS	Permanent Change-of-Station
PL18	Public Law 18

SOS	Squadron Officers School

US	United States
USA	United States Army
USAAF	United States Army Air Forces
USAF	United States Air Force
WD	War Department WWI	World War One WWII	World War Two

477th	477th Bombardment Group (Medium)

45

Bibliography

Articles

Gropman, Alan L.   The Air Force, 1941-1951:   From Segregation to Integration.   Air
Power History 40 (Summer 1993).  pp. 25-29.
Gropman, Alan L.  Tuskegee Airmen.  Air Force Magazine (March 1996).  pp. 52-56. Seiwell, Keith A. (Maj).  It Begins With Recruiting.  Proceedings (April 1994).  pp. 50-
55.
Warren, James C.  The Freeman Field Mutiny.  Prisoners of Freeman Field (April 1945).
4 p.

Books

Francis, Charles E.  The Tuskegee Airmen.   3rd ed.   Boston, MA, Branden, 1993.   pp.
193-244.
Gillead,  Le  Roy  F.	The  Tuskegee  Experiment  and  Tuskegee  Airmen  1939-1949: Establishing America’s Black Air Force for WWII. San Francisco, CA, 1994. 33 p.
Gropman, Alan L.  The Air Force Integrates, 1945-1964.  Washington, D.C.:  Office of
Air Force History, 1978.  pp. 4-33.
Osur, Alan M.  Blacks in the Army Air Forces During World War II: The Problems of
Race Relations.  Washington, D.C., Office of Air Force History, 1986.  pp. 108-122. Sandler, Stanley.  Segregated Skies.  Washington D.C., Smithsonian Institution, 1992.  pp.
119-131.
Warren, James C.  The Freeman Field Mutiny.  2nd ed.  San Rafael, CA, Donna Ewald,
1995.  213 p.

Documents

Assignment of Housing, Messing, and Recreational Facilities for Officers, Flight Officers, and Warrant Officers.  Freeman Field Base Regulation 85-2, 9 Apr 1945.
Boles, Billy J. (LtGen).   Discrimination and Sexual Harassment.   AFPAM 36-2705, 28
Feb 1995.  37 p.
Bowser, Jeff P. (Maj), et al.  The Tuskegee Airmen Experiment.  Maxwell AFB, AL, April
1996.   (Air University (U.S.) Air Command and Staff College. Research Project #
080).  ToolBook and 11 p.
Discrimination Complaints.  AFI 36-1201, 25 Jul 1994.

46

Hunt,  Robert  V.  (LtCol).	From  Tuskegee  to  Baghdad:	Black  Opportunities  and Challenges.  Maxwell AFB, AL, May 1992.  1 vol.  (Air University (U.S.) Air War College.  Research report).  75 p.
Posts, Camps, and Stations Administration.  Army Regulation 210-10, 20 Dec 1940.

Histories

History of the 477th Bombardment Group (Medium).  15 Jan 1944 to 5 May 1944, 6 May
1944 to 15 Jul 1944, 16 Jul 1944 to 15 Oct 1944, 16 Oct 1944 to 15 Jan 1945, 16 Jan
1945 to 15 Apr 1945, 16 Apr 1945 to 15 Jul 1945.
Lyon, Earl D. (Capt).  The Training of Negro Combat Units by the First Air Force.   2
Vols., May 1946.

Movie

Fishburne, Laurence.  The Tuskegee Airmen.  HBO Home Video, New York, NY.  106 minutes.

47