OMAHA BEACH

Omaha Beach had been partly cleared when the 329th Infantry landed on June 23, 1944. The only landing incident was the tripping of an enemy mine by a soldier who went outside the taped path that led from the beach. As usually happens, the explosion of the mine didn't kill the man who tripped the wire, but killed three men and wounded eight in "B" Company, which was passing on the path at the time. The regiment moved into assembly areas near Bricqueville, and on the morning of June twenty-eighth marched through Carentan and relieved a regiment of the 101st Airborne Division, which had participated in the assault landing.

Real trouble started when efforts were made to enlarge the beachhead that had been gained in the assault landing. The American army was a highly sophisticated army. Its tactics were based on the coordination of artillery fire with tank and infantry attacks, plus air support and naval support when available. In Normandy the infantry had to do the job almost alone. The hedgerows were built to enclose the farmer's pastures. They were old and solid. The basic earthen dikes had, through the years, become overgrown with bushes and trees. Tanks could not climb over them nor crash through them. To get a tank through one, it was necessary for an engineer or infantryman to blow a path through the hedgerow with satchel charges. This meant that the infantryman must capture the hedgerow without tank assistance . The artillery could fire on a hedgerow, but if it was short it did little damage; if over, it went too far to get the Germans dug into the reverse side. If the shells hit on the top of the hedgerows, they only uprooted a few bushes. Air and naval support were negligible as far as their effectiveness was concerned.

The Germans were veterans of the Russian and African campaigns. The natural camouflage of the hedgerows allowed them to emplace their machine guns completely concealed until the Americans appeared in a pasture. Then they would open up and mow down all those who were exposed. In one small pasture, a concealed German anti-tank gun knocked out four American tanks in four successive shots, and was not touched. The Germans had piled up thousands of rounds of eighty-one millimeter mortar shells. Due to their curved trajectory, the mortars were the most effective supporting weapon, and with them they saturated any American assembly area. The fighting was done at unusually close range, which gave the mortar an advantage over artillery. The American soldiers called all the shelling they received "88's" (the German artillery), but almost all of it was from 81mm mortars. The Germans had a machine pistol that was very effective at close range, but its most important characteristic was that the sound of a burst of fire from it struck terror into nerves of the infantry. It was particularly bad at night when German patrols raided our lines. So demoralized was the infantry that orders were issued to button up at dark and shoot anything that moved.

The 329th Infantry was in reserve the first day of the 83rd Division attack, but its 2nd Battalion was detached to provide a flank attack for the other two regiments. This attack was a tragedy. The battalion crossed a grassy swamp toward a woods. Intelligence reports had stated that the woods was lightly defended, and could be easily captured. The reports were just about as accurate as most intelligence reports are. The Germans were in log bunkers. They waited until the leading elements of the battalion had crossed a small stream in the center of the swamp, and then opened up with machine guns. The battalion was practically destroyed, although half of the men eventually got back by hiding in the grass until nightfall. The battalion was of little combat value for the rest of the Normandy campaign, even after its losses were replaced.

The first attack by the 329th, as a regiment, was better. The other two regiments had been stopped cold the day before, and the 329th passed them in columns of battalions just left of the Carentan-Pierers highway, with the 3rd Battalion in the lead. It was rough going -- a hedgerow at a time. An unarmed engineer bulldozer opened holes in the hedgerows for the 3rd Battalion's tanks, the operator paying no attention to the bullets that struck the dozer and whined off into space. Lieutenant-Colonel Quincy Sanders, the battalion commander, continued leading the battalion with one arm in a sling from a sniper's bullet. Captain Clifton McCarthy rode on the hull of the leading tank, with a forty-five in his hand. When Colonel Sanders was admonished about the uselessness of a forty-five, and the danger to Captain McCarthy, he replied that McCarthy was there with the forty-five to keep the tanks moving forward.

By nightfall the 3rd Battalion had advanced a mile, which is a long way through hedgerows that are about a hundred yards apart, and each successively defended. Just after nightfall George White, who was adjutant of the 3rd Battalion, came back to regimental headquarters and reported that the battalion had stopped its advance because it was running short of ammunition, and the Germans on their flank were trying to cut them off. A tank platoon was loaded with small arms ammunition and the lieutenant in charge was told to take it up to the battalion. He objected, saying he couldn't move his tanks at night. He was told to start in the morning at first light. In the morning he objected because he didn't know the way, although the path through the hedgerows was easily seen. When asked if he would follow a jeep, he said he would, so the regimental commander led him up to the battalion, which fortunately had been able to hold off the Germans until the ammunition arrived.

The situation was still not healthy. The Germans were working up the highway, and could cut off the battalion. The 1st Battalion was ordered to close up behind the 3rd to protect their flank and rear. Getting an unsatisfactory response on the telephone from the 1st Battalion, the RCO went to their command post. The battalion commander was sitting under a tree, with his head in his hands, showing no interest in anything. When the RCO spoke to him he raised his head, but showed no sign of recognition. His face, and particularly his eyes were absolutely blank. He was sent to the rear and a subordinate started the battalion forward. They closed with the 3rd Battalion in time to stop the German encirclement, but though ordered to pass through the 3rd Battalion and press on with the attack, they made no progress beyond the 3rd Battalion's front line.

After this the campaign reached something of a stalemate. With the 2nd Battalion shot to pieces the first day, and the 1st Battalion demoralized by the loss of its battalion commander and three of its company commanders, only the 3rd Battalion was offensive. Casualties soon affected the 3rd Battalion. Lieutenant-Colonel Sanders was wounded again, this time so badly that he had to be evacuated, over his strenuous objection. Major Terry Yanishewsky took over command of the 3rd Battalion, but was killed leading an attack. Major Speedie was sent up to take command of the battalion, and things started moving again, but only a hedgerow at a time.

The 1st Battalion's second in command took over command of the battalion, but only for a short time. He managed to shoot himself in the arm with a machine gun, and had to be evacuated. The most damaging losses, however, were company commanders. Captains Horace Crowder, Ralph Hartgraves, George Sammons, and Ralph Shelton were all killed. Any of them, particularly Ralph Shelton, would have made good battalion commanders. Battalion commanders, during this period, lasted an average of about two days. To get the troops to go forward, the officers, even the battalion commanders, had to get out in the front line.

The 2nd Battalion, after its initial shellacking, was kept in reserve as much as possible. Its commander, Lieutenant-Colonel Claude Bowen, survived the first attack, but was shot through the chest leading an assault a few days thereafter. The bullet that felled him went in his chest and out his back, missing the backbone by an inch. He survived, to return to duty three weeks later. After Bowen's evacuation a number of battalion commanders were tried, but none of them could get the battalion to go forward. When a leader can't get his men to go forward, there is only one thing to do -- relieve him and try somebody else, although it may not be his fault. Keep trying until someone is found who the men will follow.

The Regimental Headquarters was not trouble-free. The Executive Officer could not stand the shelling, and tried to enlarge the bottom of his foxhole with his fingernails. He was evacuated and became Provost-Marshal in Paris. The Operations Officer, a college football hero and a graduate of the Command and General Staff School, got a slight nick from a shell fragment and went to pieces. He became hysterical, and kept crying that we were surrounded and all were going to be killed. His job was taken over by Lieutenant James Bagley, who was a tower of strength from then on. The Regimental Intelligence Officer was a walking casualty. Fear was constantly written across his face as a gray mask. He probably should have been evacuated, but he kept trying to perform his duties, so he was left on the job.

The battlefields of Normandy were not conducive to high morale. To stop and care for the wounded during an attack was not possible; if we had done that there would have been nobody left to continue the attack. The wounded had to apply what first aid they could until the medicos got to them. Medicos followed close behind the attacking lines, and often gave blood transfusions while mortar shells were still dropping around them. Our Chaplains did yeoman service by carrying the wounded out of danger on their backs. The dead had to lie where they were, looking pitifully like small bundles of old clothes.

The local farmers had not been able to drive off their cattle, and these were killed, one by one, by shell bursts. After a few days the dead ones would be inflated by stomach gases, which would cause them to roll over on their backs with their legs, like two by fours, thrust straight up into the air. Over the whole area was the nauseating odor of death.

One French farmhouse lay in a valley between the two main lines. In the beginning there were a dozen cows in the farmyard. An old woman would come out twice a day and milk the cows. The cows were killed one by one. What happened to the old woman nobody seemed to know.

After a week in Normandy we became afflicted with that worst of all army diseases -- combat fatigue. It is misnamed, because in the great majority of cases neither combat nor fatigue is involved. It is just an out for a coward. We did what we could to combat it. If a combat fatigue case ever got back of our reserve line, he was permanently lost. If he was apprehended by the MP's and sent back up, he would flee again at the first opportunity. If, however, he could be kept near the front lines until he got used to the shelling, he would often recover and become a good combatant. Some of the really bad cases got out by shooting themselves in the left foot -- always the left. There were a few of these every day. The most unnecessary cases were, however, those caused by the Division Psychologist, who would go around to the companies and address the men. His visits were always followed by a big increase in the combat fatigue rate. The RCO finally asked the Division Commander to keep the psychologist out of our area, which was complied with, despite the vigorous protests of the psychologist.

The regiment now had serious replacement problems. Bad as the battalion commander casualties were, the company officer were much worse. Replacement officers, coming up from the rear areas, were seldom satisfactory. They were scared to death, were not familiar with the tactical situation, and were of unproved battlefield effectiveness. One evening a group of them were being briefed before being sent forward. Our artillery opened up on the enemy positions and as one man they all hit the dirt. The poor fellows didn't even know from which direction the artillery was firing. The RCO then made a tentative resolution which was confirmed a day or two later. A lieutenant-colonel reported as replacement for the commander of the 3rd Battalion. He was furnished a guide to take him to the 3rd Battalion and told to take over command as soon as the day's operations were over. The RCO went up to the battalion CP at dusk, to find the lieutenant-colonel sitting on a stump smoking his pipe. When asked about the situation, he replied that "Major Speedie was handling it." An attack was made the next morning at daylight, and a few hours later the RCO visited the 3rd Battalion, to find the lieutenant colonel sitting on the same stump, still smoking his pipe. When asked how the attack was going, he replied that "Major Speedie was handling it." The RCO directed him to report to Division Headquarters, and that he was relieved.

At this time a policy was put into effect. For the rest of the war the regiment requisitioned only privates as replacements. When there were vacancies in the higher grades, the best available subordinate was put in the job. If he made good he was recommended for battlefield promotion to the higher grade; if not, the next best man was tried. Several men who crossed Omaha Beach as buck sergeants finished the war as lieutenants or captains.

The campaign dragged on at terrific cost. The regiment would take a few hedgerows a day, but there was no real breakthrough like it made the first day of the campaign. The regiment should have been taken out of the line for a few days and given a chance to reorganize, but every day finished the same way, with every thing we had committed. Our companies had found out that no German patrols or counter-attacks could break through them and held solidly to what they gained. Recruit units on our right flank were not so stable, and "G" Company, after plugging the hole they left two nights in succession, sent up word to the company that they were moving in behind them at dark and would shoot anybody that came back. After that they held.

The other organizations in Normandy were just as bad as we were. The 331st Infantry Regiment, on our right, had two successive Colonels killed, Martin Barndollar and Chief Bender. The 330th Infantry Regiment, on our left, had half-a-dozen commanders wounded or relieved before they got a permanent one in Squire Foster. Most of the generals were smart enough to stay in the rear areas. One of the best in the field was relieved of command because he tried to exert some personal leadership at the front on reluctant troops. Theodore Roosevelt, who was Assistant Division Commander of the First Division, died on the field of a heart attack, probably brought on by over exertion. General Whitey McNair was killed by a shot from our air support.

We were, however, chewing up a number of German divisions, and they finally broke under a terrific bombardment by our Air Force, supporting an attack on their north flank. The air bombardment was an awe-inspiring spectacle. It is not surprising that the Germans who survived took off for Germany. Its only faults were that it came too late, and when it came it killed more American than German soldiers.

The regiment lost its fifth Executive Officer, (second-in-command) in the final breakout. Lieutenant-Colonel Robert T. Hering, on reconnaissance with the S-2, was killed when the S-2 tripped a mine.

When the American army broke out of the hedgerows, its crying need was for ports to land supplies. Brest and Cherbourg were the most important. The port of Saint-Malo, at the western end of the Brittany peninsula, was a secondary port, and while the main effort was directed at the others, the 83rd Division was given the mission of capturing the city and port of Saint-Malo. Saint-Malo has three parts; Saint-Malo proper, Saint-Servan, and Parame. On an island a few hundred yards offshore from Saint-Servan stood The Citadel, an old Vauban-type fortress built to protect the port and city. The 329th Infantry was given the task of capturing Saint-Servan and The Citadel.

The approaches to Saint-Malo were much better for military operations than Normandy had been. It was possible to use artillery and tanks much more effectively. The defenses around Chateauneuf, and particularly Saint-Joseph's Hill, offered strong resistance. The capture of the Chateauneuf positions did not take long but it cost us three successive battalion commanders in the 2nd Battalion, two wounded and one killed. Captain Clifford McCarthy was the third. He was the one who urged the tanks forward through the Normandy hedgerows, using a forty-five as the expediter. He was a great loss to the regiment. He was one of the very few men who knew no fear, and he paid for his intrepidity with his life.

Saint-Joseph's Hill was the mainland defense area of Saint Malo, and it took the combined efforts of the 329th Regiment and the 331st Regiment to break through. After Saint-Joseph's Hill was captured the other defenses of the town fell easily, and we began a street-by-street. limited objective attack through Saint-Servan. Rumors had reached the regiment of a large cache of German liquor somewhere in the city, and Lieutenant Reeder, our recreation officer, was determined to reach it before his counterpart in the 331st Regiment liberated it. He got out a little too far ahead of our troops and was captured by the Germans. As the street-by-street attack was progressing the next day, an American flag was seen waving in the street ahead. The artillery fire was stopped, and a group of about 200 German soldiers was seen massing in the street with Lieutenant Reeder at their head, waving the American flag. It developed that he had persuaded them that their position was hopeless, and they might just as well surrender. He also found out from them where the liquor cache was located.

This ended the resistance in Saint-Servan, and we moved down to the waterfront to look out upon the real obstacle -- The Citadel of Saint-Malo.

Built back in the days of pirates and seaborne attacks, The Citadel was no easy objective. Its fifteen-foot-thick stone walls, and all-around fields of fire, had been supplemented by half a dozen concrete and steel pillboxes on the landward side. The fortress was commanded by a Colonel Von Aulock, known locally as, "The Mad Colonel." Inside the fortress were about 600 soldiers. Believing in the principle of trying the easy way first, we had our Chaplain, who spoke German, call The Citadel on the telephone and ask the Colonel if he didn't want to surrender. The reply came back, evidently through his staff. "Although the American Army may stand on the banks of the River Rhine, it is incompatible with the honor of a German soldier to surrender his garrison." So that was that. We would have to take it the hard way.

The first objective was the pillboxes. Under the cover of darkness the regimental anti-tank commander moved his guns to the sea wall and entrenched them so that only the barrels were above the wall. Next day the job of silencing the pillboxes began. The pillboxes were round and about eight feet in diameter. A hit on the pillbox was not good enough. It was necessary to hit the slot from which the machine guns were fired. This took several days and very fine shooting the range averaging five hundred yards -- but eventually all were silenced.

The regiment then tried an assault. There was a narrow causeway -- just wide enough for carts -- that connected the island with the mainland. Under an artillery smoke screen, two companies dashed across the causeway and up to the fort. The Citadel, however, was buttoned up, and although our troops went completely around it they couldn't get in. To make matters worse there was another fortified island farther out in the bay, the Isle of Cezembre. When Colonel Von Aulock had his fort buttoned up he called Cezembre on the telephone, and had them shell The Citadel. As expeditiously as possible our assault troops were withdrawn.

The walls of The Citadel had been made to withstand naval gunnery and our 105mm and 155mm howitzers had no apparent effect except to knock off the fort's anti-aircraft defenses. The Air Force was asked to try to crack it open at the top. The planes came over high, although they were told that the anti-aircraft defenses had been knocked out. One bomb hit The Citadel, with no apparent damage, and the rest fell in the bay. On another try some fires were started on the top of the fort and we thought they might be effective, but it was only some oil drums and the fires soon died out.

In every strong point there is a weakness if you can find it; the weakness in The Citadel was a human weakness. After a minute search of the foreground, which was sodded, a faint path was discovered, leading from the center pillbox to the wall of The Citadel. There evidently was some kind of opening in the fort's wall at the end of that path. Lieutenant-Colonel John Skinner, our artillery commander, brought up and emplaced a six-inch gun where it could fire on the wall at that point. The first few shots showed that our assumption was correct. A camouflage net fell down revealing a door. Everybody then got into the business of adjusting artillery fire. Moving the point of impact of a six-inch projectile a foot at a time is no mean artillery problem. Finally, however, a cavernous opening appeared, and plans were made for an assault.

Two assault teams were formed, one from the 1st Battalion and one from the 3rd Battalion. Each carried satchel charges for blowing open doors and walls. The assault was to be preceded by an air bombardment. The time of the attack was set for 3:00 P.M. Colonel Von Aulock's G-2 service must have been very good. At 2:40 P.M. white flags went up all over the fort. When the flags went up the two assault teams dashed across the causeway and up to the fort. The two radio operators in regimental headquarters tried frantically to get them on the radio to call them back but their operators evidently were not listening. Attempts to stop the planes were equally futile. The first flight of planes came over and dropped their napalm bombs, fortunately in the bay. At this point some intelligent soldiers spread their recognition panels on the grass and the successive flights veered off and dropped their bombs on the Isle of Cezembre, farther out in the bay. It was a near thing. Napalm is a barbarous weapon and no country that calls itself civilized should ever use it.

The regiment took a few less than 600 prisoners from The Citadel. Colonel Von Aulock was the last to come out. He could have played the part of a Prussian officer in the movies without change. Tall, slim and erect, his make-up was perfect from highly polished boots, freshly pressed dress uniform, to an Adolf Hitler mustache. The American soldiers couldn't repress looks of admiration. When asked why he surrendered when he still had 600 troops and adequate supplies of food and ammunition, Colonel Von Aulock replied that our artillery had shot off all his defense weapons and had cracked the walls of the fort, so he could see no reason to continue the defense. When asked what effect the air bombardment had on his decision he replied, "What air bombardment?"

The 2nd Battalion of the 329th had had a rough time since its initial attack. From Lieutenant-Colonel Bowen in the first hedgerow attacks to Captain Clifton McCarthy near Chateauneuf, it had lost a half-dozen battalion commanders. Providentially, when McCarthy was killed Captain Granville Sharpe reported back for duty from a field hospital, where he had been treated for a wound received in the hedgerows. He was put in command of the 2nd Battalion. It proved to be an excellent choice.

Captain Sharpe introduced something new into the regiment's tactics. He was given the job of reducing Fort de la Verde, a supplementary position to The Citadel, which was on a small peninsula three miles to the northeast. Captain Sharpe had in some way secured a sound truck, and when he attacked Fort de la Verde he had it play, "The Stars & Stripes Forever." This, together with the "haba, haba, haba" shouts of the attacking troops so unnerved the defenders that the fort surrendered at the first assault.

The regiment's last action at Saint-Malo was the capture of the fort of Grand Bex by the 2nd Battalion. It was not a large fort but it was on a peninsula, and could he reached only at low tide. It was expected to be a tough objective but the 2nd Battalion captured it in one assault, using smoke and grenades.

Following the surrender of The Citadel, Lieutenant-Colonel Skinner located some German artillery pieces, turned them around and blasted the Isle of Cezembre. In a short time Cezembre was also displaying white flags, but the 329th did not stay long enough to take the surrender. That was arranged by Lieutenant-Colonel French of Division Headquarters, who had a native Frenchman row him out to the island in a small boat.

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