THE CROSSING OF THE ELBE

The establishment of a bridgehead across a wide river, such as the Elbe, is usually one of the toughest of military operations. It usually calls for considerable planning and preparation, including artillery support and smoke screens. The crossing of the Elbe by the 329th Infantry violated all the rules in the book. Its only virtue was that it was successful. Lieutenant-Colonel Cook of the 1st Battalion, Major Dodge, the Division Engineer, and the RCO went together to the river bank at a point near Barby and the following conversation ensued.

    RCO to Cook: "I don't see anything over there, do you?" Cook: "No."

    RCO: "What do you think of crossing.

    Cook: "I don't like it, but if you say so I'll cross."

    RCO to Major Dodge: "Where are the assault boats?"

    Dodge to RCO: "Up the highway about two miles, on trucks."

    RCO to Dodge: "How long will it take you to get them here?"

    Dodge to RCO: "About twenty minutes."

    RCO: "Okay. Bring them up and Cook -- you cross as fast as you can. They     will wake up over there in a little while and make it tough for you. As     soon as you get across we will raft over all the regimental anti-tank guns     to protect your troops from the German self-propelled artillery. I hear     that is what caused the 2nd Armored to lose its bridgehead.

The whole crossing went like clockwork. Not a shot was fired at the troops in the assault boats. They moved inland about a mile and formed a perimeter to protect the crossing site. After they were all across, rafts were built out of the assault boats, using five assault boats and bridge planks for each raft. The regimental anti-tank guns were then rafted over. By the time the Germans woke up to what was happening a solid bridgehead had been established around Walternienburg. At this time the German artillery woke up and started shelling the place of embarkation, but there was nobody left there. The next move was to break up the rafts and use the assault boats to ferry the 3rd Battalion across. It was well that we did. Although caught by surprise, the Germans had not given up entirely. During the night they launched four attacks supported by assault guns. They hadn't found any anti-tank guns in the 2nd Armored's bridgehead and their assault guns came in boldly. Our anti-tank guns knocked out their assault guns, and our infantry stopped their infantry. At daylight the bridgehead was still firm.

For the bridgehead to be of any value it was necessary to build a bridge across the Elbe that would support tanks. This was a job for the Ninth Army Engineers. They arrived while the bridgehead was being established and started building. They must have been confident that the bridgehead would hold. They worked all night and by the morning of the fourteenth the bridge was completed and everything poured across it, including a combat command, (regiment) of the 2nd Armored. The 2nd Armored had won the race to the Elbe but the Ragtag Circus had made the first successful crossing. The 331st Infantry made an assault boat crossing up the river and moved in on our right flank. The perimeter of the 329th had been advanced so that its depth was about three miles.

It was at this point that the high command missed the boat. Behind the Ragtag Circus was the rest of the 83rd Division, and the tanks of the 2nd Armored Division. The highway to Berlin was open; it was only about fifty miles away, a two- or three-day march at our usual rate. All that was needed was somebody to give the order, but there was nobody in the high command who was sufficiently interested to follow the first duty of a commander -- personal reconnaissance. The absurd alibis about the probability of receiving 100,000 casualties, and about the redoubt in the Harz Mountains were only excuses for inaction. Had they come to the Elbe River bridgehead on April fourteenth or fifteenth and talked to the commander of the Ragtag Circus and to the commanders of the 2nd Armored Division units, it might have been different. One commander in the 2nd Armored got real hostile about not going on into Berlin, and some of our G.I.'s made cracks like, "What the hell did we come all this way for if we aren't going into Berlin?" The only high commander who was interested enough to visit the bridgehead was General Simpson, and his hands were tied by orders of higher authority.

The Russians did not start their Oder River offensive until April sixteenth. It would have been easy to reach Berlin before them. The only Germans still fighting were the S.S. The rest of them would have welcomed the Americans, if their conduct during the later stages of our drive were any indication. There were some large towns, like Potsdam, and a number of canals, but the S.S. couldn't guard them all; the Elbe was the last serious barrier. Winston Churchill always appreciated the desirability of reaching Berlin before the Russians. Even Field Marshal Montgomery understood the principle of the objective, but our high command had apparently been brainwashed by "Good Old Joe."

The fighting around the bridgehead did not end with the construction of the Ninth Army bridge. The bridgehead was expanded to include the towns of Nutha and Gutergluck to allow more maneuvering room between our position and the river. The German's final effort was made against the 329th's positions in these two towns. It was a tragic effort. The Germans had assembled a small force from the remaining troops in the area and, with the support of their armored artillery, made a forlorn attack against our perimeter. Their assault guns were knocked out by our anti-tank guns and artillery, and their waves of infantry taken under fire by our machine guns and rifles. It was a slaughter. The German soldiers dropped one by one but those still on their feet kept coming. Finally not a man was left; the whole meadow they had tried to cross was littered with the dead -- a glorious but stupid action.

The base of operations of the Germans in the area was in a small city called Zerbst. After the failure of the German attack we were ordered to take Zerbst. Our artillery was softening up the town when the gates were opened and a Volkswagen bearing a flag of truce came out. It contained the Burgomeister, who asked that our artillery stop firing because they had not had time to bury their dead from the last air strike. When asked if he wanted to surrender the town replied that only the military commander could do that, but that he would be glad to take an emissary to the military commander. The RCO put the finger on Captain Schommer, who spoke German, to go back with the Burgomeister. Schommer looked as though he didn't care for the detail, but got into the Burgomeister's car without comment. In a short time he returned with the word from the military commander that he had direct orders from Hitler not to surrender the town, but that if we advanced he would not fire on us. The 2nd and 3rd Battalions advanced and took Zerbst without firing a shot. This was the last battle for the Ragtag Circus. The 329th took about 900 prisoners out of Zerbst, which brought its total take for the war to over 40,000.

We sat in our bridgehead until May fourth. A cavalry group from the 83rd Division had made contact with the Russians at a place called Appelendorf, on April thirtieth. Two days later a German Colonel appeared at the Regimental CP and asked that we evacuate 18,000 allied POW's in his camp at Altengrabow, twenty-five miles east of Zerbst, because he had nothing to feed them. Sharpe's battalion got the necessary trucks and evacuated the prisoners.

The question still remains as to why the Ragtag Circus didn't continue on into Berlin after the bridgehead was solid and a bridge built. There are three good alibis.

    1. It had no orders to go beyond the Elbe, and in fact had crossed the     river without orders.

    2. It would be obviously impossible for one regiment to capture a city as     large as Berlin if there was serious resistance.

    3. Regimental Headquarters had the impression (denied by Cornelius Ryan in     The Last Battle), that the Elbe river was the limit, by agreement with the     Russians, of the American advance.

But alibis don't win wars. It was apparent to the Ragtag Circus that it could, with support of the rest of the 83rd Division and the 2nd Armored Division, have taken Berlin before the Russians got there, and this might have made a great difference in history.

The day of the Ragtag Circus was over. From the vicinity of Sennalager, Germany, on April third, as the leading regiment of the 83rd Division, it had advanced 265 kilometers in ten days. This advance had not been without some fighting. One hundred and seventy-two cities, towns, and villages had been overrun with varying resistance, and 12,845 POWs captured. Most of the latter were non-combat serviceable, either recuperating from wounds or on leave of absence to their homes. At the end of the drive the Ragtag Circus had made "one of the most outstanding river crossing in the history of wars.

The casualties for this campaign were less than most of our others, seventy-four enlisted men killed, and twenty officers and a hundred and seventy-eight enlisted men wounded.

V.E. Day was an anti-climax as far as the 329th Infantry was concerned. The opportunity to take Berlin had passed when the Russians entered the city on May first, and proceeded to do a first-class job of looting it.

The 329th Infantry received no special commendation for its drive across Germany and its successful bridgehead. In fact TIME magazine devoted a large part of one issue explaining why the "Hell-on-Wheels" Division failed to get across the Elbe, and did not even mention the 329th Infantry, only saving "Another outfit has crossed the river farther east." Instead, the 83rd Division was selected to go to Japan to help General MacArthur finish off the war there. Major Bagley, Major Sharpe, and Major White were transferred to Division Headquarters to be General Staff Officers, and the RCO to be Assistant Division Commander. The regiment was doing some refresher training in the German training area at Grafenwohr, when a radio operator accidentally picked up the news on his radio that the Japanese had surrendered. The regiment was engaged in an attack problem at the time, and when the radio operator announced what he had heard all bedlam broke loose. It was useless to try to continue the training, so the regiment was brought in to Vilshofen on the Danube river to await transportation back to the States.

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